The Soft Budget Constraint: A Theoretical Clarification by Vahabi, Mehrdad
The Soft Budget Constraint: A Theoretical Clarification
Mehrdad Vahabi
To cite this version:
Mehrdad Vahabi. The Soft Budget Constraint: A Theoretical Clarification. Recherches
Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, De Boeck Universite´, 2001, 67 (2), pp.157-
195. <hal-00629160>
HAL Id: hal-00629160
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00629160
Submitted on 5 Oct 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
A paraître dans les Recherches Economiques de Louvain, vol. 67, no. 2, 2001. 
 
D5, L2, P2 
Keywords: soft and hard budget constraints, rationality postulate, optimization 
Abstract 
In this paper, we have distinguished three different conceptions of the budget constraint (BC). The first 
one, introduced by Clower, regards the BC as a universal (unconditional) rational planning postulate. This 
does not imply market equilibrium or optimality. The second one, advocated by Kornai, considers the BC 
as a conditional empirical fact regarding the specific behavioural regularity of agents that is determined by 
particular institutional setups. The third one is implicitly held by a number of endogenous explanations of 
the SBC notably by the Complete (optimal) Contracts Theory and the Public Choice Theory. It regards the 
BC as a matter of choice by rational agents. While Clower and Kornai try to understand the BC in the 
context of disequilibrium or at least independently of equilibrium or optimality conditions, the partisans of 
the third approach integrate the BC in the process of dynamic optimization. Although Kornai’s conception 
of the BC is irreconcilable with the third approach, it should be noted that Kornai’s standpoint is 
contradictory. In his appraisal of the hard budget constraint (HBC) in case of competitive market 
economy, Kornai contends that the application of the BC is equivalent to the realization of Walras’ Law. 
He then uses this ideal HBC as a normative reference in order to measure the inefficiencies of the soft 
budget constraint (SBC). In fact, Kornai’s standpoint with regard to the HBC and his efficiency analysis 
are in tune with the third approach.   
 
Résumé 
Dans ce papier, nous distinguons trois conceptions différentes de la contrainte budgétaire (CB). La 
première conception, formulée par Clower, considère la CB comme un postulat universel (non 
conditionnel) de planification rationnel par les agents. Ceci n’implique ni l’équilibre, ni l’optimalité. La 
seconde conception, soutenue par Kornai, interprète la CB comme un fait empirique conditionnel portant 
sur la spécificité de la régularité comportementale des agents, qui est déterminée par les matrices 
institutionnelles spécifiques. La troisième conception est sous jacente dans les explications endogènes de 
la contrainte budgétaire lâche (CBL) développée notamment par la théorie des Contrats Complets et la 
théorie du Choix Public. Celles-ci traitent de la CB comme une question de choix par les agents rationnels 
et optimisateurs. Tandis que Clower et Kornai essaient de comprendre la CB dans le cadre du déséquilibre 
ou au moins indépendamment des conditions de l’équilibre et de l’optimalité, les partisans de la troisième 
approche intègre la CB dans le processus de l’optimisation dynamique. Nonobstant les différences 
fondamentales de la conception de Kornai avec la troisième approche, sa vision est contradictoire. Dans 
son traitement de la contrainte budgétaire dure (CBD) dans une économie de marché concurrentielle, 
Kornai soutient que l’application de la CB implique la réalisation de la loi de Walras. Puis, il utilise cette 
CBD comme un cadre de référence normatif afin de mesurer les inefficacités de la CBL. En fait, la 
position de Kornai concernant la CBD et son analyse en terme d’efficacité sont en résonance avec la 
troisième approche. 
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    Mehrdad VAHABI1 
Introduction 
 
 The concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC), first introduced by J. Kornai in the context of 
socialist economies (Kornai, 1979, 1980), is now widely used in describing similar phenomena in 
post-socialist, developed and developing market economies. The concept, under the hand of its inceptor, 
alludes to a situation in which a state-owned enterprise may survive even in case of persistent losses 
thanks to the financial aid of a paternalistic state. Hence, the concept does not refer to a single bail-out, but 
a recurrent practice of rescuing firms. Then, managers would expect a rescue if losses are made, and their 
expectations would shape their behaviour. The SBC was prevalent in socialist economies.  
 Despite the shift from government to bank financing of state-owned enterprises, SBC remain an 
important problem in economies undergoing post-socialist transition, albeit to varying degrees. Kornai 
(1999b) underlines five main groups of instruments leading to the SBC in the post-socialist transition2: 1) 
fiscal subsidy; 2) soft taxation; 3) soft bank credit (non-performing loans); 4) soft trade credit (the 
accumulation of trade arrears between firms); 5) wage arrears. The SBC is particularly pressing in 
Romania, Russian Federation, China, Albania, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Belarus, etc. (Kornai, 1999b, p. 3a; 
Berglof and Roland, 1998, p. 19; Li and Liang, 1998). The survival of the syndrome of the SBC is 
especially critical in the Russian case, to the point that Pinto et al. (1999) dub russian society as a 
“non-payment society”. In this case, enterprises do not pay their suppliers, and similarly employers do not 
pay their employees or debtors their lenders. The executive and judiciary system also tolerate the situation. 
The SBC is not unknown in developing countries either. The considerable degree of government 
intervention in many developing countries, the particular importance of parastatals in industrial 
production, and the lack of numerous fully-fledged market institutions in developing countries lead to 
situations in which several cases of SBC may be identified (Raiser, 1994). Anderson (1995) stresses the 
importance of personal relationships in the politics of certain Middle Eastern countries and argues that 
many leaders of the region repeatedly obtained easy (soft) international credits due to their political 
significance. Huang and Xu ((1998), quoted in Kornai (1999b), pp. 10, 20) try to analyse the contagious 
risks and financial crises, particularly the recent Asian financial crisis in terms of SBCs.  
 The corporate finance literature has equally identified a number of sources and channels of 
transmission, or propagation, of SBCs not only in transition economies (Berglof and Roland, 1998), but 
also in developed capitalist economies (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Maskin, 1996). In fact, the 
relation between the loss-making or insolvent firms and commercial banks on the one hand, and the 
relation between insolvent commercial banks and the central bank, on the other hand, is also very relevant 
in capitalist countries. The extent to which these firms or banks are subjected to “financial discipline” and 
bankruptcy procedures under a fully developed market economy constitutes a crucial problem in the 
general process of Schumpeterian “destructive creation”. Furthermore, the SBC syndrome may be 
investigated in case of different branches of a multinational firm, or in the relationships between central 
                                                            
1 EPEH-LED, Université Paris 8, Saint-Denis, 2 rue de la Liberté, 93200 Saint-Denis, France. Comments from 
Bernard Chavance, Robert Clower, Christophe Defeuilley, Janos Kornai and two anonymous refrees are gratefully 
acknowledged. All remaining errors are the author’s. The author would like to thank Mandana Vahabi without whose 
usual assistance this paper could not be prepared in the present form. 
2 In fact, in our opinion, Kornai’s major contribution to the analysis of the post-socialist transition may be summed 
up in his insistence on the need to “harden” the budget constraint. At the beginning of the post-socialist transition, it 
was widely held that the ‘Holy Trinity’ of liberalization, privatization and stabilization would suffice to produce an 
efficient market. However, Kornai has always emphasized that hardening budget constraint should be given equal 
priority with these. The ‘magic square’ instead of the ‘Holy Trinity’ is what can be found in his most recent 
contributions regarding the “organic development” of a private, market economy: “There is close causal relations 
between healthy development of private sector, hardening of the budget constraint, forceful restructuring of 
production, and as the ultimate result, the growth of labour productivity.” (Kornai, 2000, p. 10). 
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and local governments (Qian, 1994). Dewtripont and Maskin (1995) apply the concept to explain 
differences between Anglo-Saxon (USA and UK) and German-Japanese corporate finance. Aizenman 
(1993) underlines the relevance of the SBC for all economies with limited controllability of the decision 
making processes. For example, the concept may be used to clarify the consequences of a separation 
between the central bank and the treasury or among ministers or local governments with regard to fiscal 
resources. The importance of this issue has been recognized in the recent macro and development 
literature, which focuses on coordination failure caused by multiple competing decision makers 
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1996; Daver and Panunzi, 1997). Last but not least, the concept is also mobilized 
to analyse the research and development (R&D) investment under different institutions in developed 
countries (Bös D. and C. Lülfesmann , 1996; Huang and Xu, 1998).   
 The scope of this paper does not allow us to provide a detailed study of different empirical aspects 
of the SBC. However, the practical significance of this phenomenon and its pervasiveness justify our 
endeavour to scrutinize the theoretical meaning of the SBC. 
 Since the beginning of the nineties, a vast formalized literature has been developed to capture 
different causes and consequences of the SBC. In practice, various definitions of the SBC have been used 
in the literature and several surveys have identified the theoretical and empirical aspects of this 
phenomenon3. While the focus of this literature has been the “softness” of budget constraint, it failed to 
note the change in the meaning of the “budget constraint” that has occurred since Clower’s seminal paper 
(1965) on the subject. In fact, the widespread use of the SBC notion has led to “softness” (lack of rigour) 
in the use of the budget constraint concept. 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the meaning of the budget constraint (BC) in Clower, 
Kornai, and the recent literature in order to provide a theoretical clarification of the SBC syndrome. 
 Section 1 discusses Clower’s interpretation of the BC as a rationality postulate which should be 
clearly distinguished from both a bookkeeping identity, and an equilibrium or optimality condition. 
 Section 2 studies Kornai’s critique of Clower’s interpretation of the BC as well as his standpoint 
on the subject. It will be argued that for Kornai the BC is not a rationality postulate, but an empirical fact 
regarding the behavioural regularity of agents. This behavioural regularity is determined by the 
institutional environment. Different degrees of the BC, ranging from soft to hard ones, may be 
distinguished. The SBC defined as ex post bailouts of the loss-making firms by a paternalistic state refers 
to a survival behaviour (corresponding to H. Simon’s saticficing criterion) by managers. The HBC, by 
contrast, describes the behavioural regularity of agents in a competitive market economy. In Kornai’s 
terminology, the HBC refers to what Clower calls BC. However, contrary to Clower, Kornai’s contention 
is that the HBC implies both a rational behaviour and the satisfaction of equilibrium and optimality 
conditions. Accordingly, we will underline a contradiction in Kornai’s viewpoint with regard to the 
meaning of BC. While in his analysis of the SBC, Kornai deals with the BC as an empirical fact, in his 
explication of the HBC, he considers the BC as a profit-maximizing (efficiency) condition.  
 We share with Kornai the treatment of the BC as an empirical fact and argue that this position is 
more coherent than Clower’s definition of the BC. The reason is that even though Clower’s distinction 
between the rationality postulate and optimality condition is justified, it cannot be denied that they are 
consistent. However, the BC as an empirical fact may not have any bearing on the optimality condition. 
Conversly, we do not agree with Kornai that the HBC implies the application of the Walras law, since it 
once again confuses what Clower tried to clarify, i.e. to distinguish between the rationality postulate and 
equilibrium or optimality conditions. It will be further argued that Kornai’s contradiction is particularly 
developed through his efficiency analysis of the SBC. We will especially stress the contradiction between 
the use of “saticficing” (survival) criterion in the definition of the SBC, on the one hand; and the use of 
efficiency analysis in determining the inefficiencies of the SBC, on the other hand. 
 Section 3 explores the recent formalized literature on the SBC. While Kornai’s explanation of the 
SBC is exogenous, this literature provides endogenous explanations of the SBC. Kornai’s intuition is 
                                                            
3 For a survey of the theories on SBC, see Maskin, 1996; Berglof and Roland, 1998; Kornai, 1998b. For an empirical 
survey on the SBC, see Begg and Portes, 1993; Kornai, 1999b. 
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formalized and developed further in two directions: its pure economic ingredient (asymmetrical 
information) has been developed by the contractual theory; its political ingredient by the Public Choice 
theory. The first orientation endogenizes the SBC as a non-commitment and time inconsistency 
phenomenon4. Decentralization is frequently advocated as a solution to devise an optimal self-enforcing 
contract. However, the formal authority relationship, i.e. the vertical or hierarchical relationship cannot be 
captured in this perspective. The second orientation endogenizes the political aspect through lobbying 
activities and interprets the SBC as a rent-seeking phenomenon. In this perspective, bribery as well as 
legal obligations are identified as solutions to the SBC. The new microeconomics in its different versions 
(contractual theory, public choice, etc.) treats the budget constraint as a matter of choice of 
profit-maximizing agents in their strategic behaviour. It will be argued that this recent literature further 
develops the efficiency element of Kornai’s analysis and holds the position which has been sharply 
criticized by Clower namely, the BC as both a rationality postulate and optimality condition. However, a 
branch of  the incomplete contract theory (unverifiable incomplete contracts) shows that the SBC may be 
an efficient solution for developing innovative activity. This result mitigates the two Kornai effects that 
emphasize the inefficiencies of the SBC. 
 Although the efficiency element of Kornai’s analysis may be invoked as a theoretical background 
for recent endogenous explanations of the SBC (notably those of the Complete Contracts Theory and the 
Public Choice Theory), it will be stressed that Kornai’s original theory of the BC as an empirical fact is 
completely irreconcilable with this literature’s notion of  the BC as a strategic behaviour of the 
profit-maximizing agents.  
 A short conclusion will follow. 
1. The budget constraint: A bookkeeping identity or a rational postulate 
  
 The concept of budget constraint (BC) is one of the fundamental concepts of standard 
microeconomics5concerning the household’s behaviour. Disregarding the possibility of credit, it simply 
asserts that the household’s total spending plan cannot exceed its budget constraint, namely the total 
expected monetary revenue at its disposal. For a long time, the budget constraint has been considered as a 
bookkeeping identity. We owe the treatment of BC as a “rational postulate” of the household’s “planned” 
(or intended) behaviour to Clower (1965), Clower and Due (1972), and Clower and Leijonhufvud (1975, 
1981)6 . Clower (1965) employs Say’s Principle (SP) as synonymous of BC and tries to clarify the 
                                                            
4  One of the refrees finds objectionable that “(T)he author designates the behavior of the principals as 
time-inconsistent...That term should be used only in the context of individual choice”. However, in the contemporary 
market theories, the term is also used in case of principals in general, be it state or other collective entities, since 
principals are also considered as “representative agent”: “Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Schaffer (1989), and 
Schmidt (1996) have developed models in which time-inconsistency of the Center lies at the heart of the soft budget 
constraint syndrome” (Segal, 1998, p. 597).  
5 Walras intimated the “rationality” version of the budget constraint. He imposed a restriction of “zero value of 
(planned) trade” for the individual trader, but this was quid pro quo (Say’s Principle), not income constrained utility 
maximization (see Jaffe, 1954, p. 165). According to Jaffé, Walras considered his equations of exchange which were 
“budget constraints” as part of the requirements for justice in exchange. This interpretation has been contested by 
Walker (1996, p. 47-48) who denied any normative implication for budget constraints in Walras. While the budget 
constraint is implicitly present in walras, as Costa (1998, p. 137) rightly argues the concept of budget constraint 
cannot be found in Walras. Allegedly Vilfredo Pareto (1909/1927) first formulated the concept. Hicks acknowledged 
primarily Pareto, and Slutsky (1915), and all later users of the budget constraint concept apparenly drew on the same 
source (see, for example, Kornai, 1980). The budget equation in Hicks (1939, p. 305) bears a close resemblance to 
Pareto’s “budget of the individual” (1909/1927, p. 160; 1911, p. 90) and Costa (1998, p. 137) conjectures that 
constrained utility maximization entered standard price theory by way of Pareto. The modern versions of the concept 
were first developed by Hicks (1939) and Samuelson (1948); it was then introduced by Arrow-Debreu (1954), 
Debreu (1959), and Arrow-Hahn (1971) in the general equilibrium theory. Patinkin (1956) integrated it in his 
monetary theory of general equilibrium. 
6 In these articles, Clower and Leijonhufvud’s purpose is to show that the neo-classical price theory may be regarded 
as a special case of Keynesian economics, valid only in conditions of full employment. In the same vein, Eisner’s 
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prevalent confusion among economists between SP and Walras’ Law7. According to Clower, SP should 
not be defined by Keynes’ familiar formulation: “Supply creates its own demand”, since it does not imply 
any bookkeeping identity between aggregate supply and aggregate demand. It only states that “...the net 
value of an individual’s planned trades is identically zero.” (Clower and Leijonhufvud, 1981, p. 80, 
emphasized by me). He intentionally does not refer to the “net market value”, since SP only holds that the 
“expected” or “planned” purchases of a household cannot exceed its “planned” or “expected” revenues. 
Trades that Clower refer to are “theoretically admissible” and are not actual market trades. In this 
respect, prices and quantities are also conceived in the context of “mental experimentation” and hence 
make an allusion to “expected” purchase prices and “planned” quantities and not to quantites actually 
purchased or prices actually paid (Clower and Due, 1972, p. 64). 
 Considering a very basic exercise in microeconomics, SP amounts to the household’s decision 
problem of determining how a given amount of money Rm will be allocated to purchase quantities Qx and 
Qy of two commodities that are available at given money prices Px and Py. If the household is assumed to 
be risk-averse, the set of all theoretically admissible trades of money for commodities will consist of 
points that lie on a single budget line such as: 
 (1)         Px Qx* + Py Qy*- Rm = 0 where Q*= (Qx , Qy) 
Let us denote budgets that satisfy equation (1) by Q = (Qx , Qy). The set of budgets Q is, of course, a 
subset of the set of all possible budgets Q*, i.e. Q*eQ. By definition it is true that 
 (2) Px Qx + Py Qy - Rm = 0 
In other words, all theoretically admissible budgets Q identically satisfy equation (1). This zero-net-value 
identity is defined as SP by Clower. However, in this example, SP is explained in its non-aggregative 
version. Although J.B. Say, himself, did not provide an aggregative version of his principle, it is not hard 
to formalize an extension of his model. Clower and Leijonhufvud (1981) extend the basic model in two 
respects. The first one is to allow that the household retains some of the available money for future 
disposal. In this case, the application of SP implies that the set of theoretically admissible budgets should 
be revised as Q = (Qx , Qy , Qm) where Qm denotes the quantity of money that the household plans to hold 
for future disposal. Then the zero-net-value identity may be defined as 
 (3) Px Qx + Py Qy + (Qm - Rm ) = 0 
 The second extension is to permit that the household be a supplier of non-money commodities as 
well as a supplier of money. Applying SP to this case, the zero-net-value identity can be formulated as 
 (4) Px (Qx - Rx ) + Py  (Qy - Ry ) + (Qm - Rm ) = 0 
where the symbols Rx and Ry, like the symbol Rm represent decision parameters and denote (non-negative) 
stocks of non-money commodities available for possible sale. Now if we assume that the household is a 
possible transactor of a large but finite number of commodities (1, 2, ...,m) where the m-th commodity is 
money, then we obtain 
 (5) P1 (Q1 - R1 ) + P2  (Q2 - R2 ) +...+ Pm-1(Qm-1 - Rm-1 ) + (Qm - Rm ) = 0 
To simplify the notation, we define the household’s excess demand for the k-th commodity by the 
relation: 
 (6) xk = Q k - Rk (k = 1, ..., m) 
Using equation (6), identity (5) can be redefined as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(1975) and Tobin’s (1975) articles can be quoted. The importance of this discussion notwithstanding, our present 
paper follows another line of inquiry, namely the significance of the budget constraint in economic theory.  
7 What “Say’s Principle” or “Say’s Law” means is an old subject of controversy among economists. Schumpeter 
(1954, vol. 3, chapter six) and Sowell (1972) summarize Say’s Law in six propositions. Quoting at length Say’s 
writings, Baumol (1977) tries to show that at least eight different “laws” or formulations can be derived from Say’s 
works. Lange (1942, p. 64) contends that Say’s Law applying to a barter economy is a particular case of Walras’ 
Law which applies to a money economy. This contention has been criticized by Clower and Leijonhufvud (1981, pp. 
97-98). For our purpose what really matters is not the historical clarification between different versions of Say’s 
Principle or Say’s Law, but whether SP (as equivalent of BC) is describing a bookkeeping identity or a rational 
postulate of an individual transactor’s behaviour. In this perspective, the distinction between Walras’ Law and SP 
becomes crucial.      
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 (7) P1 x1  + P2  x2  +...+ Pm-1xm-1  + xm  = 0 
 Now if we consider a large but finite number of households, then we may distinguish among 
quantities associated with different transactors by adding a second numerical subscript 1, 2, ..., k to 
relevant variables. For instance, the variable xij denotes the j-th transactor’s excess demand for the i-th 
commodity. In the new matrix of theoretically admissible trades, the individual household’s aggregate 
demands for any commodity can be symbolized as 
 (8) Skj=1 xij = Xi (i = 1, ..., m) 
We may then write the money value of aggregate excess demand for the i-th commodity as 
 (9) Skj=1  pi xij = pi Skj=1 xij = pi Xi (i = 1, ..., m) 
The last term is zero, since the money value of the sum of all aggregate excess demands is identically 
equal to zero. Hence we obtain, 
 (10) Smi=1 pi Xi = 0 , (i = 1, ..., m) 
This last equation is called by Clower, the “aggregative version of SP” (Clower, 1965, p. 117; Clower and 
Leijonhufvud, 1981, pp. 87-88). This version of SP is formally equivalent to what O. Lange (1942, p. 64) 
dubbed as Walras’ Law. Although they are formally equivalent, they are not economically equivalent. 
Economically speaking, two major conceptual distinctions should be emphasized between SP and Walras’ 
Law. First, Walras’ Law describes market equilibrium prices and quantities. As Patinkin (1956, p. 25) 
suggests this law asserts that if prices are such that all markets for non-money commodities satisfy the 
general equilibrium condition, namely if Xi = 0 for i = 1, ..., m - 1, then the money market must also be in 
equilibrium Xm = 0 . Put it differently, if supply equals demand on m - 1 markets, then the market is in 
equilibrium on the m-th market (Arrow and Debreu, 1971, p. 4). However, Clower’s definition of SP (both 
in its simple and aggregative versions) refers to the aggregate excess demand for planned (notional, 
intended, desired) purchases or sales of commodities. It is not related to any actual market equilibrium. 
The term market cannot be employed to describe the individual (or aggregate) decision-making behaviour. 
Second, in the economic literature the reference to Walras’ Law tacitly assumes that the trading plans of 
individual transactors satisfy some sort of optimality conditions, i.e. maximize some function in addition 
to relevant behaviour constraints. This assumption is certainly true for the statements of Lange, Arrow, 
Debreu, Hahn, and Patinkin for whom individual excess demand functions are defined independently of 
Walras’ Law. However SP does not imply that all individuals in the economic system are behaving 
optimally and hence are maximizing some function. Nonetheless, it is worthy to note that the maximizing 
behaviour is entirely compatible with the rationality postulate and subsequently Clower’s conceptual 
distinction between optimality and rationality has no bearing on the real decision-making process. 
According to Clower, “The familiar budget constraint...asserts...that no transactor consciously plans to 
purchase units of any commodity without at the same time planning to finance the purchase either from 
profit receipts or from the sale of units of some other commodity. For later reference, I shall call the last 
and very general proposition Say’s Principle. This is essentially a rational planning postulate, not a 
bookkeeping identity or a technical relation. Unlike the market principle known as Walras’ Law, 
moreover, Say’s Principle does not depend on the tacit assumption that values are calculated in terms of 
current market prices, or on the equally tacit assumption that market prices are independent of individual 
purchases and sales. Neither does it suppose that individual behaviour is in any sense optimal. Thus, 
Say’s Principle may indeed be regarded as a fundamental convention of economic science, akin in all 
relevant respects to such basic ideas of physical science as the Second Law of Thermodynamics.” 
(Clower, 1965, p. 116, emphasized by me). 
 Clower’s contribution may be summarized by three propositions: 1) the budget constraint (SP) is 
not a bookkeeping identity but a rational postulate; 2) SP does not imply any maximizing behaviour; and 
3) SP even in its aggegative form should not be confused with Walras’ law. In our opinion, the first and 
the second propositions are somehow contradictory, since the rationality assumption is compatible with 
the maximizing behaviour. In fact this compatibility explains why the aggregate version of SP is formally 
equivalent to Walras’ Law. 
 
2. The budget constraint: a rational postulate or an empirical fact 
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 J. Kornai borrows Clower’s interpretation of the budget constraint (SP) as an ex ante behavioural 
regularity and does not confuse it with the bookkeeping category of the balance sheet of the firm. The 
latter is an ex post identity, whereas the BC is an ex ante constraint “related to the firm manager’s 
expectations” (Kornai, 1979, p. 807, emphasized by me). Nevertheless Kornai rejects Clower’s definition 
of BC as an ex ante rational behaviour. Because BC as a rational postulate should always hold true for 
describing the behaviour of transactors except for the very exceptional cases such as “a thief or a 
philanthropist” (Clower and Due, 1972, p. 65). For Kornai, the BC is not an axiome but an empirical fact8  
(Kornai, 1980, p. 320). Its existence as well as its intensity (or degrees) depends on the institutional matrix 
which forms agents’ expectations or attitudes in a particular economy. In other words, the BC as a 
“decision rule” is determined by the particular institutional setup of an economy and not by the 
unconditional rationality assumption. More generally, macroeconomics cannot be founded on the 
assumption that there exist patterns of micro behaviour valid for any social and historical conditions. For 
instance, Kornai (1979, 1980) introduces the concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) in the context of 
socialist economies referring to the phenomenon that socialist firms are bailed out persistently by state 
agencies when revenues do not cover costs. A competitive capitalist economy may be characterized by the 
hard budget constraint (HBC), where the BC (in Clower’s sense) is systematically applied in 
decision-making. 
2-1. The softness and hardness of budget constraint and Walras’ law 
 It is noteworthy that Kornai applies the concept of BC not only in case of households or 
individuals but also in case of enterprises. In standard microeconomics, enterprises maximize profits 
subject to transformation function (technology constraints). Only households are subject to a BC. One of 
Kornai’s theoretical inventions is to broaden the application of the concept of BC as an ex ante 
behavioural regularity in case of firms. The SBC describes the attitude of firms in a socialist economy 
where a paternalistic state never lets any firm go bankrupt and always bails out a loss-making firm. The 
paternalistic relationship between the state and firms is the institutional matrix that explicates the lack of 
responsiveness of socialist enterprise to price fluctuations (Kornai, 1980, chapter 14; 1985, pp. 50-52; 
1992, p. 146). Kornai’s definition particularly underlines the ex post bailouts or ex post state intervention9. 
However, an ex ante state intervention may equally lead to the SBC. If an economic unit obtains some 
subsidies, tax reliefs, preferential loans, etc. before the start of the financial period, its BC is soft in a 
preliminary sense. This observation brings Szabó (1988) to distinguish between a preliminary (ex ante) 
and an incremental (ex post) softness of budget constraint. Although Kornai considers the dichotomy 
between ex ante/ex post state intervention as rigid (Kornai, 1998a, p. 14), it is rather “incremental” than 
                                                            
8 In his recent contributions, Clower (1994) advocates that there is no way to make progress in economic science 
except by first discarding neowalrasian analysis and treating economics as an inductive science. He writes: “(T)he 
neowalrasian code exerts an insidious influence even on those who, like myself, have long harbored doubts about 
conventional formalist economics. For reasons that even in retrospect are inexplicable to me, my every attempt to 
break out of the neowalrasian mold seemed to end in a toy model that has a fundamentally neowalrasian cast; in 
effect, the neowalrasian code acts like a black hole, consuming everything it touches and cloning even residual orts 
into an Arrow-Debreu monster.” (1994, p. 810). Nevertheless, Clower (1995) does not reject entirely axiomatics in 
economics. Borrowing the physicist J.L. Synge’s distinction between the real world (R-World) and the model or 
mathematical world (M-World), he undelines that “It is not meaningful to ask of a formal model whether it is true or 
false, only whether it is more or less useful than another model for a particular purpose.” (1995, p. 309). In this 
sense, the budget constraint can never be interpreted as an empirical fact, but only as a rationality axiom. However, 
we may ask why the BC cannot be reinterpreted in accordance with “economics as an inductive science”, especially 
when in reality the BC does not hold not only in exceptional cases such as the behaviour of a “thief or a 
philanthropist”, but also in the behaviour of managers in socialist economies, or in many post-socialist economies, 
etc. In our opinion, the treatment of the BC as an empirical fact contributes to economics as an inductive science.    
9 As Schaffer (1998, p. 84) notes the ex post bailout definition of the SBC is allegedly more relevant to the 
policy-making discussions, since “Policy-makers are often encouraged to ‘harden the budget constraint’ of chronic 
loss-making firms by letting them close down, refusing them subsidies,...” 
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“preliminary” softness which he thoroughly analyzes10. This type of softness can shed some light on the 
problem of survival. The BC is hard if grave financial difficulties drive the firm to bankruptcy. It dies of 
its losses. The BC is soft if the paternalistic state guarantees automatically the survival of the firm. Such 
an economy may be labelled as a “no-exit-economy” (Raiser, 1994, p. 1852). This institutional setup 
generates some particular norms 11  or behavioural regularity  which drive the firm not to adopt a 
profit-maximizing behaviour. Kornai and Weibull (1983, p. 166) state: “In describing the behaviour of the 
firm, we want to have a more general framework than the usual profit-maximizing pattern...In addition, 
we apply -following Simon (1959)- the saticficing model of decision-making. This approach seems to be 
more general and realistic, and in the present model profit maximizing appears as a special case of the 
more general pattern.” In his later works, Kornai rarely quotes H. Simon and his “saticficing criterion” 
(Simon, 1952-53, p. 26), and he allegedly ignores the relation between the “bounded rationality” 
assumption and “saticficing” modelling. Nevertheless, for Kornai the SBC is essentially a 
non-maximizing survival behaviour. Kornai’s treatment of the SBC as an empirical fact (and not a rational 
postulate) allows him to overcome Clower’s contradictory interpretation of the BC as both a rational 
postulate and a non-maximizing (non-optimal) behaviour. The ex ante SBC as ex post bailouts 
(incremental softness) can easily reconcile the survival attitude of the firm with its non-maximizing 
(non-optimal) behaviour. In this context, the “saticficing criterion” based upon the “bounded rationality” 
assumption is more convenient to describe the behavioural regularity of a firm functioning under a 
paternalistic state than Clower’s rationality postulate12.          
 The non-maximizing behaviour of an enterprise marked by the SBC may also be tackled from 
another aspect. According to Szego (1991), Kornai’s SBC notion presumes that causality runs from 
savings to investment, whereas savings do not constrain investment at the aggregate level. Instead, 
aggregate investment determines aggregate savings. Furthermore, the enterprise is not constrained by its 
savings and its investment is autonomous13, since it is based on its ability to obtain credit and to vary its 
leverage ratio. “Consequently, the level of credit taken on by the firms is determined by, rather than the 
determinant of, the level of investment.” (Szego, 1991, p. 330). She concludes: “If credit money is truly 
endogenous in a capitalist system, then a hard budget constraint does not exist in capitalist or socialist 
systems.” (p. 330). However, as Kaldor (1982) argues, the volume of bank lending or its rate of expansion 
is always limited only by the availability of credit-worthy borrowers. Hence, the distinction between credit 
worthy and non- credit worthy borrowers becomes crucial. That explains why Kaldor (1985) 
acknowledges the relevance of Kornai’s SBC notion not only for describing a socialist system but also for 
“Britain in wartime and in the immediate postwar years”: “Professor Kornai attributes this to the absence 
of effective budget constraints on business enterprises that cannot go bust or be liquidated even though 
they have continuing losses, as well as to an insatiable appetite for new investment, so the number of 
projects started, or in train, generally exceeds the volume initially planned.” (Kaldor, 1985, p. 37). 
                                                            
10 It should not be forgotten that in a socialist economy as well as a capitalist economy, there exist some strategic 
sectors or strategic priorities in producing some products or services that lead to a preliminary softness of BC. 
Hence, despite the sound remark of Schaffer with regard to the importance of  ex post bailouts in policy-making, the 
relevance of ex ante softness in policy-making cannot be ignored. This particular form of softness is not elaborated in 
Kornai’s oeuvre.   
11 For an analysis of the concept of “normality” in Marshallian tradition in general and in Kornai’s works in 
particular see Vahabi (1998). 
12 Keren (1993) also underlines the non-maximizing behaviour of a firm under the SBC and advocates that the 
Nelson-Winter’s (1982) evolutionary view of the firm is more compatible in this context: “Under a SBC the 
assumption of a maximizing firm, be it of profits, growth, or any other objective, becomes untenable, and one has to 
adopt the Nelson-Winter (1982) view of the firm as an organization following certain historically determined rules of 
behavior, or policies. All firms may be acting according to a given ‘corporate culture’ but the financial market may 
act like a Darwinian disciplinarian to weed out all nonconformist firms. In a socialist system all survive, not only 
those fittest for the market. Consequently we must think of socialist firms as followers of given rules of thumb, 
designed to function well in the bureaucratic environment...” (p. 338).  
13 Knell (1988) argues that since the firm is not constrained by its savings, we should rather speak of “finance 
constraint” than “budget constraint”. 
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Criticizing Szego’s article, Kraft (1993) also stresses the distinction between the credit worthy and 
non-credit worthy borrowers and suggests an interesting demarcation line between a “hard-finance” 
economy and a “soft-finance” one: “Lenders in a hard-finance economy are profit-oriented, while lenders 
in a soft-finance economy are not.” (Kraft, 1993, p. 156). Although Kornai’s formulation of the state’s ex 
post bailouts relies upon exogenous money theories, Kraft endeavours to reformulate it in terms of 
endogenous money theories. Accordingly finance constraints can be considered as soft when banks (either 
commercial banks or the central bank directly) provide all the liquidity firms need regardless of repayment 
prospects and prospective return (Kraft, 1993, p. 159). In other words, banks (like a paternalistic state) 
consent to give “loans” to enterprises on a non profit-oriented basis.  
 One of the major implications of the SBC is that SP as a rational postulate is not valid in a 
classical socialist economy and together with it, Walras’ Law (in the sense of Clower) is not valid either. 
The reason is that the validity of Walras’ Law presupposes an HBC. Even though the application of BC 
(rationality postulate) is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient for the validity of Walras’ Law. 
Contrarily to a classical socialist economy, in a competitive market economy the HBC is prevalent and it 
determines the behavioural regularity of every entrepreneur. Accordingly SP is valid. But does it mean 
that Walras’ Law is valid in such an economy? Kornai’s answer is positive. “In the capitalist system the 
firm has a hard budget constraint...in a socialist economy in contrast the firm’s budget constraint is soft...It 
follows from this that in the former system Walras’s law prevails. In the latter system, however, Walras’s 
law is not effective, at least within the firm sector.” (1980, p. 558). Put it differently, in a competitive 
market economy, Walras’ Law holds since SP is valid. However, as Clower and Leijonhufvud (1981, p. 
92) demonstrate, the validity of SP does not exclude unemployment and thus does not imply automatically 
the validity of Walras’ Law. Although Kornai concedes the distinction made by Clower (1965) between 
SP and Walras’ Law in case of a socialist economy, he blurs this distinction with regard to a competitive 
market economy. In our opinion, the demarcation line between a competitive market economy and a 
socialist economy cannot be made by referring to the validity of Walras’ Law in the former and its 
non-validity in the latter. In fact, budget constraint (soft or hard) describes a behavioural regularity of 
households, firms, and state at a microeconomic level and not an equilibrium condition at a 
macroeconomic level. For instance, even in a classical socialist system not all agents are marked by the 
SBC. While socialist firms have a SBC (Kornai, 1980, p. 515), households are subject to the HBC 
(Kornai, 1980, pp. 514) since they cannot expect to cover their planned expenditures by anything except 
their expected revenues. The socialist state has a BC which is neither completely hard, nor completely 
soft. It is not hard, since the state budget has to cover losses of socialist enterprises. It is not always soft, 
since current expenditures of state agencies are usually subject to HBC (Kornai, 1980, pp. 528-29). The 
macroeconomic regularities of an economic system cannot be derived directly from its microeconomic 
behavioural regularity. Borrowing Kornai’s terminology, our contention is that the causality direction is 
rather from institutional setup to behavioural regularity than the other way around. In the Economics of 
Shortage (1980) two contradictory lines of argument may be found in this respect. On the one hand, 
Kornai acknowledges that institutional setup explicates behavioural regularities, on the other hand, he 
distinguishes different macroeconomic (dis)equilibrium states on the basis of microeconomic regularities. 
This contradiction stems from Kornai’s hesitation between a behaviouralist and an institutionalist 
approach14. An institutionalist approach is quite compatible with Clower’s distinction between SP and 
Walras’ Law, since this distinction stresses the relative autonomy of microeconomic assumptions from 
macroeconomic (dis)equilibriums. 
                                                            
14 Kornai’s recent definition of “institutions” is also based on his hesitation between an institutionalist and a 
behaviouralist approach: “It (institution-M.V.) includes, for instance, the prevailing legal order in the system 
concerned, its moral norms and its property rights, the distribution of positions of power, the incentives working on 
the actors in society, and the information structure.” (Kornai, 1999a, p. 9). This definition includes both formal and 
informal rules on the one hand, and motivational and informational structures on the other hand. While the first 
ingredient is compatible with an institutionalist approach (North, 1990, 1993), the second one is inspired by a 
behaviouralist approach (Simon, 1991). It should be noted that chronologically Kornai first adopted a behaviouralist 
approach (1971) and later prefered (1980) an institutional explanation of economic phenomena (see Vahabi, 1997). 
 9
 It is noteworthy that wherever Kornai adopts a clear institutionalist standpoint (Kornai, 1984), he 
locates economies on a continuum ranging from entirely soft to totally HBC, depending on the degree to 
which market coordination of activities is replaced by bureaucratic coordination. Different degrees of BC 
are thus considered as empirical facts exogenously given in different institutional contexts. They provide 
a basis for a comparative static analysis of different economic systems or sectors. The originality of this 
type of comparative analysis is that it focuses on the comparison of two differnt systems with regard to 
their specific institutional pecularities, for example socialism as a shortage economy is compared with 
capitalism as an underemployment economy. This excludes the comparison of socialism as a concrete 
economic system with a pure competitive market economy as an ideal system. The problem with Kornai’s 
work (1980) is that we do not find only this type of comparative analysis. In fact, two contradictory lines 
of comparative analysis may be distinguished in his arguments. While a first line of comparative analysis 
suggests a study of a socialist economy as a SBC economy with reference to a pure competitive market 
economy as a HBC economy, a second line of study advocates a comparison of a socialist economy as a 
shortage economy with a capitalist economy as an underemployment economy. In our opinion, the second 
line of study is consistent with an institutionalist approach and contributes to “economics as an inductive 
science”15, whereas the first line of study may be criticized for its logical inconsistencies. 
2-2. The soft budget constraint and its economic and political ingredients 
 In describing the SBC, Kornai refers to all kinds of situations in which a firm can obtain an 
income through the exercises of economic power in the market place, bargaining power in government 
and other offices, or simply as a consequence of the paternalistic relationship between institutions and the 
firm (Kornai, 1986). There are at least two conceptually separable elements in the essential SBC problem: 
one is related to the pure economic power relationships and the other is associated to the political power 
relationships. The first one includes the exercises of economic power due to the monopoly position in 
market, or due to the asymmetrical information between agents. The second one refers to particular formal 
authority relationships existing between superiors and subordinates in a vertical or hierarchical structure. 
 Regarding the relationship between the SBC and the monopoly position of firms, Kornai 
contends: “The economy is becoming highly concentrated; huge corporations being founded. They are no 
longer price-takers but price-makers. This is one of the basic factors from the point of view of softening 
the budget constraint. A large capitalist corporation is able to react to input price changes not by adapting 
its input-output combination, but by adjusting output price to actual costs plus the expected mark-up. By 
its price-making power it can almost ‘automatically’ guarantee its survival, its self-perpetuation.” (Kornai, 
1980, pp. 311-12). Compared to a competitive market economy, a monopoly economy is characterized by 
a softer BC since agents are price-makers. In this way, Kornai is suggesting that the SBC is a more general 
phenomenon applying not only in socialist economies, but also in developed market economies. However, 
Kornai’s argument does not seem convincing and it is even contradictory with his own formulation of the 
SBC. This is because a monopolist price-maker tries to “maximize” its profits (and is usually motivated to 
gain “super-profits” or “monopoly rents”) and this is contradictory with a “saticficing” behaviour under a 
SBC. Furthermore, contestable market theories (Baumol, 1982) aver that even in a monopoly situation 
incumbent firms cannot “automatically” guarantee their survival due to competitive threats by “potential” 
entrants. Besides, a monopolist price-maker setting a price higher than the marginal cost may be forced to 
reduce its production below the quantity at which the unit cost is at its minimum, simply because of 
buyers’ reluctance to buy at that price. Thus the seller should try to win buyers over from her competitors 
by some other means, especially non-price ones. In other words, an imperfect competition situation does 
not automatically imply a sellers’ market. It may be quite compatible with a buyers’ market. 
Consequently, the SBC cannot be explained by the mere price-making capacity of agents. These possible 
                                                            
15 As we noted earlier, this expression is coined by Clower (1994). Simon (1997) also advocates an empirically 
based microeconomics. Kaldor’s insistence on “stylized facts” instead of axiomatics and the need for developing an 
“economics without equilibrium” (Kaldor, 1985) can be interpreted in the same vein. By treating the BC as an 
empirical fact, the present paper tries to contribute to the same research program which considers economics as an 
inductive science. 
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objections may perhaps explain why this line of argument has not been followed by Kornai in his recent 
writings: “...(T)he producer under imperfect competition competes for the buyer, tries to learn as much as 
possible about his demands and adapt to them..., reversing the situation in a shortage economy, where the 
buyer tries to win the seller’s favour with flattery or bribes.” (1997, p. 17). 
 Asymmetrical information structure between socialist managers (Agents) and ministries 
(Principal) is also regarded by Kornai as a factor leading to the SBC. “A very important element in the 
SBC syndrome is that external assistance is a matter of bargaining for more subsidy, tax-exemption, for 
permissive administrative prices, etc. Everything is negotiable-not on the market but with the paternalistic 
institutions.” (Kornai, 1985, p. 50). This lobbying by managers for preferential treatment of their 
enterprises is closely related to their “private” information concerning the real capacity of their enterprise 
and with regard to their “unverifiable” (for their superior ministries) level of effort in realizing the 
directives of a taut plan. In the non-written “contract” between socialist managers (Agents) and 
paternalistic state (Principal), there exist a moral hazard and an adverse selection problem that partially 
explain the extent of budget softness as the outcome of firms’ opportunistic behaviours and their 
bargaining power. Kornai’s recent definition of the SBC (Kornai, 1997, 1998b) explicitly incorporates the 
notion of “contract violation”. Budget constraint is softened if 1) buyers do not pay for the goods they 
buy; 2) debtors do not honor their debt contracts; 3) tax payers do not pay taxes; 4) producers do not cover 
their costs out of their revenues (Kornai, 1997, pp. 141-42; 1998b, pp. 1-2). Although this “contractual” 
interpretation of the SBC has been recently emphasized by Kornai, in his previous writings he did not 
identify the lobbying activities of managers as the main cause of the SBC. He argued that the SBC was 
essentially an outcome of a paternalistic state16. The SBC was thus posited exogenously as an empirical 
fact depending on particular political and institutional relationships. Kornai’s main concern was to 
investigate the consequences of SBC in terms of efficiency in comparison with a competitive market 
economy.  
2-3. The soft budget constraint and two Kornai effects 
 Kornai’s principal result may be summarized in following terms: in a comparative static analysis, 
the SBC is a source of both real and nominal (or monetary) inefficiencies. The first type of inefficiency 
(real inefficiency) is related to the fact that the presence of ex post bailouts increases the firm’s demand 
for inputs beyond the standard perfectly competitive level. This phenomenon is known as “Kornai effect”, 
since it was first explored by Kornai and Weibull (1983) and then developed in other formalized versions 
by Goldfeld and Quandt (1988, 1992, 1993), Ambrus-Lakatos and Csaba (1990), Scott (1990), Magee and 
Quandt (1994), Pun17 (1995), and Prell (1996). According to Kornai, the SBC syndrome is partially 
responsible for generating the chronic shortage characteristic of the socialist system. This relation is being 
questioned by Bajt (1991), whereas some recent models endeavour to establish a relationship between the 
SBC and the shortage phenomenon even during the post-socialist transition (see Qian, 1994). Following 
Prell, we name this type of inefficiency as the first Kornai effect. The second type of inefficiency 
(nominal inefficiency) is related to the fact that firms under the classical socialist system have a weak 
price responsiveness. Prell (1996, p. 268) calls this phenomenon the second Kornai effect. In this way, 
the SBC may be decomposed into two diffferent types of softness which correspond to what Gomulka 
                                                            
16 Kornai depicts a classical socialist system as a “command economy” rather than a “bargaining economy”. The 
difference is crucial, since in the former one, the emphasis is on hierarchical vertical relationships while in the latter, 
the focus is on the lobbying powers of large enterprises and regional party organizations. As Szamuely and Csaba 
(1998) note: “From our perspective, the basic strength of the analysis (Kornai’s analysis-M.V.) was its presentation 
of the command economy as a logically closed system, in which all subsystems and phenomena depend upon one 
another... Antal gave a detailed account of the emergence of a bargaining society in place of the enlightened 
absolutism of O. Lange and W. Brus. Unlike Kornai, Antal stressed the fundamental role of the political and the 
institutional system in reproducing patron-client relationships in formally decentralized areas.” (p. 185, emphasized 
by me).  
17 Contrarily to other cited theories, Pun (1995) does not compare situations with SBC to those without SBC in order 
to grasp the role of Kornai effect. His objective is to investigate whether the input demand is higher with softer 
budget constraints or not. 
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(1986, p. 77) dubbed as “r-softness” (the letter “r” standing for real) and “m-softness” (the letter “m” 
standing for monetary or nominal softness). In his critical appraisal of Kornai’s theory of the SBC, 
Gomulka defines the “r-softness” as resource loss, or efficiency slack evaluated at competitive market 
prices. This resource loss softness clearly corresponds to the first Kornai effect. He considers the 
“m-softness” as efficiency loss evaluated in terms of actual distorted prices. This nominal softness clearly 
correponds to the second Kornai effect. For measuring the real inefficiency (r-softness) and monetary 
inefficiency (m-softness), Scott (1990) suggests to decompose the SBC in two parts, namely income effect 
and substitution effect by using both Hicks, and Slutsky measures. In our opinion, despite the fact that the 
Hicks and Slutsky measures are defined for consumption analysis and thus for households’ budget 
constraints, they can also be soundly employed to clarify graphically inefficiencies in case of the SBC if 
the “transformation curve” or tecnical constraints be regarded as firms’ budget constraints. A graphical 
presentation can be useful in order to distinguish between these two different types of inefficiency. 
 Suppose that for producing a given output Y, two kinds of input (X1, X2) are used. In case of 
perfect competition, the BC is hard and the production function may be denoted as Yh(X1, X2). The firm 
produces Y- from the input vector {X-1, X-2}, Y- = Yh(X1, X2) for a total input costs of Ch, where h stands 
for a point on the HBC. The relative price input ratio is tga ═X-1/ X-2. In case of the SBC, the firm 
produces the same quantity of output Y- on an inferior production function, Ys(X1, X2) from the input 
vector {X+1, X+2}for a total input costs of Cs, where s stands for a point on the SBC. The relative price 
input ratio is tgß ═X+1/ X+2. The source of this technical inefficiency may be Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency 
or the use of some obsolete technology. The extent of budget softness measured by the difference between 
Cs and Ch can be broken down in two ways. The first way, shown below in figure-1, measures the extent 
of real inefficiency. This first Kornai effect (r-softness) can be split in two parts: the first part (Ch - A) 
measures the technical inefficiency (which is equivalent to the income effect in consumption analysis), the 
second part (A - Cs) measures the substitution effect generated by distorted input prices.  
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 Suppose that Ch and Cs denote respectively the cost levels of firms H (functioning under the HBC) 
and S (functioning under the SBC). If firm H, initially subject to Ch, decides to shift to the technically 
inferior production function Ys(.) while maintaining its relative input prices of tga ═X-1/ X-2, then it should 
bear additional costs of r1 (measured in units of X2) in order to produce the same quantity of output. r1 can 
be considered as the Hicks measure of the budget softness, since it takes into account the loss associated 
with the degradation of  technical efficiency from Yh(.) to Ys(.). However, r1 cannot be empirically 
measured, since point A is not observable. Thus the Slutsky measure r2 may be more convenient. In other 
words, the evaluation of the first Kornai effect can be carried out in two ways, either by the Hicks measure 
or by the Slutsky measure, the second one being empirically preferable. The second Kornai effect 
(m-softness) may be analyzed  
in the same manner. 
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 Suppose that Ch and Cs denote respectively the cost levels of firms H (functioning under the HBC) 
and S (functioning under the SBC). If firm S, initially subject to Cs, decides to shift to the technically 
superior production function Yh(.) while maintaining its relative input prices of tgß ═X+1/ X+2, then it 
would have the same level of production Y- with a cost saving of m1 (measured in units of X2). This is the 
Hicks measure, since it measures the extent of required subsidies to cover the firm’s loss functioning on a 
technically inferior isoquant. However m1 cannot be empirically measured, since point B is not 
observable. Thus the Slutsky measure m2 may be more convenient. In other words, the evaluation of the 
second Kornai effect can be carried out in two ways, either by the Hicks measure or by the Slutsky 
measure, the second one being empirically preferable. 
 Our general result may be summed up as follows: in a comparative static analysis, the SBC (both 
r-softness and m-softness) is always a source of inefficiency, and it can be empirically evaluated by the 
Slutsky measure. 
 Both Kornai effects have been widely formalized. The first Kornai effect is usually represented by 
a simple model treating the firm as an expected-profit maximizer18. The crux of these models is that output 
                                                            
18 Goldfeld and Quandt who particularly contributed in the formalization of the first Kornai effect acknowledge that 
their profit-maximizing hypothesis does not correspond to Kornai’s analysis of  managers’ behaviour in a 
centralized economy. This is because the principal motivation of these managers is to ensure the subsistence, 
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(or output price) is uncertain and the firm receives subsidies when its operating profits are negative. 
Goldfeld and Quandt (1988, 1990, 1992), Ambrus-Lakatos and Csaba (1990) develop a family of models 
of the SBC in which the size of the subsidy received by a loss-making firm is determined in part by 
resources devoted by the firm to managerial lobbying activities. The general result of their models is that 
the SBC can increase factor demand and, hence contribute to shortage in socialist economies. Hillman, 
Katz, and Rosenberg (1987) also examine the consequences of government ex post bailouts on input 
demand. In their model, the firm is subject to an uncertain output price. A low price triggers a government 
bailout, because otherwise the firm should reduce employment and unemployment is politically costly. 
Despite the fact that the authors do not explicitly refer to a SBC situation, their model also formalizes the 
first Kornai effect. Goldfeld and Quandt (1993) explore the softness effect in case of a double uncertainty 
with regard to revenue and cost. The model exhibits a diversity of solutions, including a full range of 
multiple equilibria where the effect of bailouts on input demand depends on the technology, the variances 
of the random variables and the correlation between them. Finally, Prell’s model (1996) shows that the 
first Kornai effect holds for all neoclassical production functions on the basis of diminishing returns. 
However, the validity of the second Kornai’s effect depends on more restrictive conditions. It holds for the 
case of linear marginal product whether the effect (price responsiveness) is defined in terms of slopes 
(Kornai, 1992) or in terms of elasticities. For other types of functions, it only holds entirely where the 
elasticity of substitution between factors s < 1, whereas if s > 1 the converse of the effect holds, namely 
the SBC firm is more responsive in elasticity terms than the competitive firm. 
 Reviewing the formalized literature on the inefficiency of the SBC, two critical remarks should be 
raised. First, although these models treat uncertainties with regard to the cost or income, the uncertainty 
concerning the nature of the product is excluded. In other words, firms are always supposed to produce a 
generic or a standardized product. The innovative activity is not the object of analysis. Borrowing 
Schumpeter’s distinction between “adaptive response” and “creative response” (Schumpeter, 1947, pp. 
149-150), we claim that Kornai’s inefficiency effects relate to the SBC in an economy with adaptive 
response where there is no real innovative entrepreneural activities. However it is not clear whether the 
SBC in an economy with creative response may lead to inefficient results19. It may be justly argued that a 
comparative static analysis is not convenient to capture the effect of the SBC in the context of creative 
response. The soundness of this observation notwithstanding, it brings us to recognize the limits of a 
comparative static analysis. Second, there exists a contradiction between Kornai’s definition of softness 
and his inefficiency effects. Because as we noted above, he defines the softness of BC on the basis of 
survival (and not maximizing) attitude of managers, whereas the efficiency analysis requires a model 
based upon maximizing behaviour. In fact, Kornai refers to a competitive market economy in its 
equilibrium (optimal) state as an economy with a HBC. Like Clower, Kornai defines BC as a behavioural 
regularity; but unlike Clower he confuses a behavioural regularity with the existence of equilibrium. The 
problem with Kornai’s definition of BC is that he interprets this constraint both as a behavioural 
regularity (in case of SBC) and as an equilibrium condition (in case of HBC). While the definition of 
BC as a behavioural regularity does not imply maximizing behaviour, the definition of BC as an 
equilibrium condition implies maximizing behaviour. Kornai’s efficieny analysis is conducted on the basis 
of a confusion between two different conceptions of BC both as a behavioural regularity and an 
equilibrium condition. The formalized versions of Kornai effects remove this contradiction, since it 
assumes a maximizing (optimizing) behaviour for firms. This assumption is in tune with Kornai’s 
efficiency analysis, but it completely violates the original sense which Kornai initially attributed to this 
concept as an empirical behavioural regularity. The logical result of this revision is to interpret the BC 
as a strategic behaviour of maximizer agents. In this way, the SBC may be endogenized as a rational 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
survival, and viability of their enterprises that may be called (following Simon) “identification with one own’s job” 
(Goldfeld and Quandt, 1988, p. 505). 
19 In fact, Bös and Lülfesmann (1996) modelize the efficiency effect of the SBC in an innovative sector where the 
contracting firm does not produce a generic product but a specific goods whose technology is (at least partly) 
unknown at the date the project is started.  
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choice by maximizing agents. The SBC is no longer considered as an exogenous behavioural regularity 
depending on specific institutional setups, but as an endogenous strategic behaviour followed by 
maximizer agents. 
 
3. The budget constraint as a matter of choice 
 
 Kornai’s theory of the SBC is an exogenous one, since “(A) strong, even a key part is played by 
the relation of the actor performing the softening with the surrounding political and social environment 
and the external economic factors.” (Kornai, 1998b, p. 13). In other words, the softness is not explained by 
the internal interests of the softening institution (state), and thus it cannot be regarded as a strategic 
behaviour by a maximizing agent. As Bardhan (1993) justly notes, there are at least two conceptually 
separable elements in the essential SBC problem: one is an information or agency problem, the other is a 
political problem largely involving the problem of credible commitment on the part of the state. During 
the nineties, both informational and political elements of the SBC problem have been treated by several 
formalized versions of endogenous explanations of the SBC particularly by Complete (optimal) Contracts 
Theory and Public Choice Theory.  
3-1. The asymmetrical information problem and the SBC 
 By  endogenous explanations, we mean the analysis of the SBC as an outcome of the internal 
interests of the softening institution (be it state or other organization playing the role of Principal). In this 
perspective, the degree of budget constraint is also a matter of rational choice by maximizing agents. The 
pioneering work in this field belongs to Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). According to the authors, the 
SBC syndrome pertains wherever a funding source, for example, a bank or government finds it impossible 
to keep an enterprise to a fiscal budget, i.e., whenever the enterprise can extract ex post a bigger subsidy or 
loan than would have been considered efficient ex ante. In this sense, the SBC problem extends well 
beyond socialist economies, since the extent to which loss-making firms or projects are terminated or 
refinanced is also very relevant in capitalist (both developed or undeveloped) economies. 
3-1-1. The adverse selection and gambling bank models 
 In Dewatripont and Maskin’s model, time inconsistency of the Center lies at the heart of the SBC 
syndrome: if the Center were able to credibly commit itself to not subsidize the firm ex post, the firm 
would make more efficient ex ante decisions. The SBC is accordingly treated as a more general dynamic 
commitment problem where an agent can fail to take an efficient action, or can undertake an inefficient 
action, because he knows that he will receive additional finance. Hardening of budget constraint then 
means creating conditions for a credible commitment not to refinance an agent20. Their model describes a 
situation in which a superior organization (for instance, a bank) is deciding whether to finance investment 
projects of certain enterprises. There exist two kinds of projects: the fast and the slow ones. The fast 
projects are “good” investments and can be completed in one period. The slow projects are “bad” 
investments, since their completion will be delayed and cost more than “good” ones. Banks cannot 
distinguish between these two different types of projects, whereas managers know the quality of projects. 
Managers can hide their information concening the quality of projects and banks are prone to approve 
some bad projects that are ex ante unprofitable. However, banks have all the negotiating power in 
negotiating financing and may propose take-it-or-leave offers. The model bases the SBC on creditors’ 
adverse selection and lack of commitment not to refinance bad projects. The authors argue that for large 
creditors, it is worthwhile and feasible to refinance a project after the initial investment is sunk. It is so 
because the marginal benefit of refinancing may exceed the marginal cost, although the total sum invested 
in the project may end up being higher than its proceeds. Small creditors would not have the liquidity to 
continue these projects and would be more likely to terminate them. The model shows that the 
                                                            
20 Schaffer (1989), and Huang and Xu (1998) present game theoretic models in which the SBC results from the 
inability of the Center to commit credibly not to rescue a firm that fails. In Schaffer (1989), the addition of imperfect 
information on the part of the firm about whether the state is “weak” (paternalistic) or “tough” enables to build a 
reputation for thoughness and impose HBC on firms. 
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decentralization of credit leads to several small creditors who cannot afford to refinance bad projects and 
thus may commit themselves to refuse refinancing. The decentralization can thus contribute to hardening 
budget constraint. Bai and Wang (1995) suggest that the creditors who rely on managers to screen projects 
may force the managers to refinance some ex post unprofitable projects. By continuing such bad projects, 
the creditors pass on losses to the managers and, therefore, the managers are more careful in screening 
projects. In both models, the difference between the ex ante inefficiency of future refinancing and the ex 
post benefit of refinancing due to sunk costs is crucial to characterizing SBC. Without ex ante 
inefficiency, refinancing would not be wasteful; without the ex post benefit to refinancing, the rationale 
for the SBC would be missing. However, while in Dewatripont and Maskin’s model the ex ante 
inefficiencies and the ex post benefits all accrue only to the bank, in Bai and Wang’s model the 
inefficiencies are shared by managers and banks. In both models, SBC results from adverse selection. The 
adverse selection models of the SBC are also developed by Qian (1994), Berglof and Roland (1997), and 
Bai and Wang (1998). 
 In the adverse selection models, the creditors invest in a “bad” project due to their lack of 
information about the quality of projects. However in the gambling bank model (Stiglitz, 1994), an 
insolvent bank may be willing to invest in a risky project with an expected payoff that is low or even 
negative, because if the gamble pays off, the bank will become solvent, whereas if the gamble does not 
pay off, the bank will become “more insolvent”, i.e. no worse off than it was before it made the risky loan. 
This type of model extends the SBC concept to include the situation in which an insolvent bank may be 
willing to invest in a project that is expected ex ante to be loss-making, albeit not with certainty. Thus the 
creditor has no motive to credibly commit itself not to finance a probably very “bad” project. However as 
Schaffer notes: “In both the gambling bank model and the adverse selection models, the financing 
decision is profit-maximizing for the creditor. In the former, the bank can return itself to solvency only 
by taking on projects that have some small probability of generating a very high payoff, even if ex ante the 
expected payoff is negative. In the latter, prior to the first period, the project is not known to be bad and 
prior to the second period, the project is actually good.” (1998, p. 84, emphasized by me). There exist a 
fundamental difference between these endogenized versions of the SBC and Kornai’s exogenous version 
of the SBC as the ex post bailouts of loser firms by a paternalistic state. For understanding the difference, 
it suffices to ask what would happen if, ex ante, the creditor would know with certainty that the firm will 
be a loss-maker? Schaffer contends: “In both the gambling bank model and the adverse selection models, 
if a creditor learns ex ante that the firm is definitely a “bad” firm, it will refuse to finance it since to do so 
would be throwing money away. This is in sharp contrast to a model of ex post bailouts due to paternalism 
because in such a model the likelihood of obtaining financing is unaffected by ex ante revelation to the 
creditors that the firm is expected to be loss-making. If the firm is loss-making ex post, it is subsidized as a 
result of its situation and, consequently, the firm has a soft budget constraint.” (1998, p. 84). In other 
words, Kornai’s theory of the SBC is not based on a profit-maximizing behaviour, whereas both the 
gambling bank model and the adverse selection models are founded on this assumption. 
3-1-2. The moral hazard models 
 Another strand of endogenous explanations of the SBC has been developed on the basis of moral 
hazard problem at the level of the firm and the absence of a credible commitment at the level of the 
center. Qian and Roland (1994, 1998) and Berglof and Roland (1998) present models of this type. In fact, 
Berglof and Roland’s basic model (1998) is a modified version of the Dewatripont and Maskin’s (1995) 
model. The authors study the SBC problem in the context of firms-state relationships under socialism, in a 
two-period setting. Their model also describes a situation in which a superior organization (in this case, 
the state ) is deciding whether to finance investment projects of certain enterprises. At the beginning of 
period 1, firms draw n projects (normalized to 1) and submit them to government. There exist two kinds of 
projects: either fast in proportion a or slow in proportion (1-a). The fast projects are “good” investments 
and can be completed in one period. The slow projects are “bad” investments, since their completion will 
be delayed and cost more than “good” ones. The state is prone to approve some bad projects (in proportion 
1-a) that are ex ante unprofitable. All project costs have start-up (sunk) cost of 1 monetary unit. At the end 
of period 1, good projects yield a gross monetary, and taxable return of Rf and deliver private benefits 
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Bf>0 to the firm’s management. Bad projects yield the same outcome only if the firm exerts high effort so 
that Bf is the private benefit net of effort. Herein lies the crucial difference between Dewatripont and 
Maskin’s adverse selection model and Berglof and Roland’s moral hazard model. In the former, there is 
no effort decision in firms, while in the latter firms can decide whether or not to submit a project. If the 
firm exerts low effort, then the project yields zero return after one period. The state can then decide 
whether to liquidate the firm’s assets, in which case it earns a liquidation value L while the manager would 
have a net private benefit of 0. The state may refinance the loan in order to earn a gross return Rs at the 
end of period 2, while the firm would earn a private benefit of Bs. The authors assume that the state 
maximizes the net returns to investment plus the private benefits of firms. All monetary returns are 
assumed to go back to the government as repayment for the initial loan. Firms are thus solely interested in 
maximizing their total net private benefits. If the prospect of refinancing encourages the managers not to 
exert high effort in case of bad projects, then there exists a SBC due to an incentive problem. Put it 
differently, the lack of credible commitment to not refinance the ex ante unprofitable investments can 
provoke a moral hazard problem at the level of the firm. The moral hazard prolem may also occur in the 
relationship between financial institutions and the state. Financial institutions know that because of the 
existence of deposit insurance and the too-big-to-fail doctrine that the government has an incentive to 
prevent them from failing and thus already have a moral hazard motivation to believe that a government 
rescue of some sort will be forthcoming. Discussing different aspects of an international lender of last 
resort, Fischer (1999) underlines the moral hazard problem in the relationship between such an institution 
(like IMF) and national states. In the Mitchell model (cited in Berglof and Roland, 1998), SBC arises 
because bank incentives are distorted due to limited liability and to imperfect monitoring of bank 
behaviour by the state. The moral hazard version of the SBC seems to fit better the reality of post-socialist 
transition in which firms must undertake restructuring efforts.  
 It is noteworthy that Kornai also tries to reinterpret his exogenous SBC theory in the context of 
contractual approach as a moral hazard problem. “Under the old contract that ran under pre-reform 
socialism, the insurance company (i.e., the state) covered the losses in full. If an enterprise found itself in 
financial trouble, the state bailed it out unconditionally...This is the groups of phenomena that I termed 
softness of the budget constraint in my earlier works. Also apparent was a side-effect well known in 
insurance theory: the so-called moral hazard. If policy-holders know that the insurer will pay for all 
damage, it is not worth them making efforts to avoid damage, which in this context means that enterprises 
are insufficiently motivated to avoid losses by raising efficiency.” (1997, p. 142, emphasized by me). In 
our opinion, Kornai’s reference to the insurance theory for describing the behaviour of a paternalistic state 
is not relevant, since an insurance company can never unconditionally cover the losses of an enterprise in 
full. In fact, an insurance company tries to maximize its profits. Herein lies the fundamental difference 
between the endogenized versions of the SBC as moral hazard and Kornai’s exogenous version of the 
SBC as the ex post bailouts of loser firms by a paternalistic state. The unconditional coverage of all the 
losses of a firm by a creditor whosoever systematically provokes the low level effort. In such 
circumstances, the only way to curb the low level effort is the use of supra-economic force like the 
execution, imprisoning, or other severe punishments of managers. That was in fact the way Stalin ruled 
and imposed his discipline during the classical (pre-reform) socialism. 
3-1-3. The complete and incomplete contracts theory and the SBC 
 The endogenous explanations of the SBC either as an adverse selection or a moral hazard problem 
try to capture the asymmetrical information problem inherent in the SBC problem. In all these models, the 
SBC is treated as a strategic behaviour by profit-maximizing agents in the presence of market failures due 
to imperfect information. The solution is explored in devising an optimal incentive scheme (Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1996) in order to assure a credible commitment through a self-enforcing contract. However, 
the optimal contract theory is not an appropriate theoretical framework for treating the vertical power 
relationships. Borrowing Max Weber’s (1968, p. 215) distinction between real authority and formal 
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authority21, Tirole (1994) argues that someone with superior information may have effective power, even 
though he does not have legal power, because those with legal power may follow his suggestions. The 
optimal contract theory can capture a real authority relationship, since it is consistent with a horizontal 
relationship between agents. This power stems from an informational (economical) superiority that can be 
concentrated indifferently in the hands of Principal or Agents.  Contrarily to the real authority, the formal 
authority cannot be integrated in the optimal contract theory since it presupposes the existence of 
hierarchical relationships between superiors and subordinates. This legal or political sense of authority is 
essential in Kornai’s theory of SBC, since “The SBC syndrome can occur when a vertical relation of 
superiority and subordination replaces or imposes itself on the horizontal relation. This clearly occurs 
under the socialist system...However, researchers recognized from the outset that it is much more 
widespread, and appears under other systems, if only sporadically.” (1998b, p. 5). As O. Williamson 
(1985) rightly underlines the hierarchy cannot be reduced to a “nexus of contracts”22. Hierarchy involves 
transaction costs of different sorts especially those related to the implementation of contracts, namely the 
costs of going to courts, lawyers, etc. It thus involves a third party verifying the execution of the contract’s 
terms by parties to a contract. Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that the postulation of significant 
transaction costs and the use of dynamic programming cannot be reconciled. The rationality needed to 
perform dynamic optimization in standard models is strong enough to ensure that transaction costs are 
irrelevant. The complete (optimal) contract theory builds upon hyper-rational agents and dynamic 
programming and ignores significant transaction costs23, whereas the Transaction Costs and Property 
Rights theories introduce significant transaction costs and call for bounded rationality of agents or 
judges 24 . According to the Transaction Costs theory, bounded rationality implies that all complex 
contracts (like most of the  contracts between the state and firms) are unavoidably incomplete and many 
are maladaptive. The reasons are two: many contingencies are unforeseen (and even unforeseeable); and 
the adaptations to those contingencies that have been recognized and for which adjustments have been 
                                                            
21 Although Weber’s distinction is very useful conceptually, we may insist that in practice the exercise of power is 
usually related to a combination of both types of authority. A notable example is the eminence grise phenomenon 
who usurps both real authority in relation with his superior and formal authority in relation with his subordinates.  
22 Analysing the firm as hierarchy, Williamson states: "The efficacity of fiat turns critically on the fact that hierarchy 
is its own court of ultimate appeal" (Williamson O., 1992, p. 340). According to "classical" contractual approach, the 
firm is considered as a "nexus of treaties" (Williamson O., 1989, pp. 1-26). However, Williamson suggests that the 
market contracts have to be distinguished from the intra-firm contracts. This distinction is justified according to the 
existence or the absence of confidence. The firm should necessarily establish confidence between its members, since 
in case of disputes, resorting to a legal authority will be costly in terms of efficiency. It is even sometimes impossible 
because of courts refusal to hear some intrafirm disputes over identical technical issues. It would be convenient to 
call for an internal arbitration in order to resolve such intrafirm disputes. Accordingly, hierarchy is its own court of 
ultimate appeal. 
23 Maskin and Tirole (1999) do not reject the bounded rationality assumption in principle. They even regret that for 
the time being our profession has made little progress toward modelling bounded rationality in a satisfactory way. “If 
we are to explain “simple institutions” such as property rights, authority (or more generally, decision processes), 
short-term contracts, and so forth, a theory of bounded rationality is certainly an important, perhaps ultimately 
essential ingredient. But for now, it is not the only reasonable approach as we argue below. In the short run there are 
really two options: to focus on simple institutions by assumptions, or to reject the conventional wisdom that 
complete contract theory is incapable of explaining simple institutions.” (Maskin and Tirole, 1999, p. 106). In our 
viewpoint, the partisans of the Property Rights theory as well as Transaction costs economics are right in arguing that 
the complete contract theory cannot explain institutions (see Vahabi, 1999). 
24 It is noteworthy that while transaction costs economics assumes boundedly rational agents, the property rights 
theory maintains the hyper-rationality assumption for the parties to a contract. However, the latter theory 
distinguishes between the hyper-rationality of agents and bounded rationality of judges (Hart, 1990). The property 
rights theory holds that while the terms of a contract may be observable for the parties of a contract, in case of legal 
disputes a third party (for example, a judge) cannot verify which party is responsible for an eventual breach of the 
initial contract. In this sense, the theory stresses the “incompleteness” of contracts due to the unverifable character 
of contracts by a third party (see Hart and Moore, 1988; Hart, 1995). 
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agreed to are often mistaken. The incompleteness of complex contracts has both practical and theoretical 
significance. The practical lesson is that all the relevant contracting action cannot be concentrated in the ex 
ante incentive alignement but some spills over into the ex post governance. The theoretical lesson is that 
differences among organization forms lose economic significance under a comprehensive contracting 
setup because any form of organization can then replicate any other. The Transaction costs theory 
combines incompleteness with farsighted contracting by describing the contracting process as one of 
“incomplete contracting in its entirety” (Williamson, 1996, pp. 9, 26, 46-47, 236). “Plausible 
farsightedness,” as against hyper-rationality is considered to be a sufficient theoretical assumption. In our 
opinion, the treatment of the SBC  as an outcome of a particular institutional setup, i.e. the vertical 
hierarchical relationship, is more consistent with the assumption of contractual incompleteness and 
bounded rationality.   
 Bös and Lülfesmann (1996) explore the problem of the SBC in government contracting within the 
theoretical framework of incomplete contracts. They first underline the differences between two branches 
of incomplete contracts, namely the unverifiable and the verifiable incomplete contracts. The first branch 
(Hart and Moore, 1988) follows the assumption that in case of legal disputes between the parties to a 
contract, the court can observe whether the project has been cancelled, but it cannot assign the 
responsibility for that event to any one party. Accordingly, the inclusion of breach penalties into the initial 
contract is not feasible; the completion of the project after the initial phase is a voluntary decision of both 
agents. Hence the renegotiation of the terms of contract becomes appealing. In contrast to Hart and Moore, 
the second branch (Cheung, 1991; Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1994) shares the assumption that a court 
can verify who is guilty for not trading in the case of an ex post cancellation of the project. Implicitly, this 
approach expresses the view that the exact nature of the goods at stake is known and verifiable at the 
beginning of the relationship. The Hart-Moore voluntary trade assumption, however, fits into a setting 
where the precise design of the project is not quite clear at the starting date. In their paper, Bös and 
Lülfesmann stick to the Hart-Moore assumption as they try to investigate the nature of the government 
contracting when it  buys specific goods from private enterprises whose technology is (at least partly) 
unknown at the date the project is started. Their model includes two periods: the first period is the 
innovation phase and the second period is the production and trade phase. The authors show that in the 
presence of uncertainy regarding the nature of the goods, there is a rationale in upward renegotiation of 
contracted prices in public procurement. Hence, contrary to what is commonly believed, the 
post-contractual price adjustments do not necessarily result from commitment failures and cannot be 
considered as inefficiencies inherent in government procurement. “(I)n a public-procurement model there 
exist incomplete contracts which implement the first best. Renegotiation takes place if trade is efficient 
but the private contractor is not willing to complete the project because ex ante contracted trade price is 
too low. In such a case the welfare-optimizing procurement agency will (and should) offer renegotiation 
which leads to a higher trade price. This is a rational justification of soft budget constraints...If there is no 
uncertainty, the result changes drastically. In this case the optimal contract requires that the supplier 
become residual claimant to his cost savings in all states of nature. Hence, renegotiation never occurs.” 
(Bös and Lülfesmann, 1996, p. 71). This result is very important since it makes it clear that the Kornai 
effect regarding the inefficiency of the SBC should be limited to the case of standard goods, whereas in 
case of innovative activities the SBC may be the source of efficiency. It should be noted that the Bös and 
Lülfesmann model is also based upon the assumption of profit-maximizing agents and in this respect the 
model maintains the efficiency analysis. However, the peculiar feature of the model is that it is an 
unverifiable incomplete contract and hence the third party or the judge is supposed to be boundedly 
rational. This “slight” modification allows us to mitigate the results concerning the inefficiency of the 
SBC. In our opinion, while Kornai’s efficiency analysis is more consistent with a complete contracts 
theory, his theory of the SBC as a survival behaviour is inconsistent with the hyper-rationality assumption 
and fits better into a theoretical setting where the rationality assumption is relaxed in one way or another 
such as unverifiable incomplete contracts. 
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 Finally, one of the reasons for which Kornai draws upon the contract theory in his recent writings 
is to provide the credibility condition for “no bail-out” commitment by the state (Kornai, 1997, p. 149). In 
fact, one means of generating commitment to policies that have short run costs is to build a reputation for 
toughness in a repeated game. Even a player for whom toughness is very costly may wish to invest in a 
demonstration that it is following a rule such as “tit-for-tat”, or to imitate the behaviour of a genuinely 
tough player. However, models in which reputations can be created often have multiple equilibria, several 
of which may seem intuitively plausible. Therefore, after a history of concessions, a mere announcement 
of a new policy of toughness without institutional changes may not be granted much credence, and 
defending a reputation for not subsidizing loss makers relies on a degree of coordination of expectations 
that is implausible in a complex economy25. A reputational mechanism alone, as advocated, for example 
by Schaffer (1989), is allegedly unlikely to provide a reliable remedy for the government’s tendency to 
bail out loss makers. That explains why Hardy (1992) proposes the institutionalization of a social safety 
net in order to create such a reputation for the government not to bail out: “Once enterprises see that the 
government has provided a cushion against unemployment, they will recognize that the government has 
less motive to cover their losses, and they will plan accordingly.” (1992, p. 312). Although the social 
safety net proposition is completely justified, as Stiglitz (1999, pp. 6-8) argues, the drastic fall in 
production and massive unemployment in Russia and many other post-socialist countries discredits any 
policy of hardening budget constraint (especially the institution of bankruptcy) by building a credibility 
for toughness of the government. 
3.2: The asymmetrical objective functions and the SBC 
 The asymmetrical information is not the only problem leading to the SBC. The second problem, 
or the political one, which is at the heart of the SBC syndrome resides in the differences in goals between 
the government and firms. These two problems cannot be completely separated and thus in many models 
the SBC is defined both in relation with the asymmetrical information structure and the asymmetrical 
objective functions. However they may be conceptually separated. When considering the asymmetrical 
objective functions, the nature of the government becomes crucial. Two different assumptions may be 
distinguished. The first one is to consider a benevolent government. In that case, the softness cannot be 
explained by the internal interests of the government and accordingly the softness explanation would be 
exogenous. Three types of models may be grouped in this category: 1) the Kornai and Weibull (1983) 
model of the SBC as ex post bailouts; 2) the externality models (Segal, 1998; Daveri and Panunzi, 1997; 
Wildasin, 1997); and 3) the insiders control model (Li, 1998). Some studies of state subsidies have 
rejected the paradigm of benevolent government in favor of a positive theory of government or a 
“malevolent” government. The most notable study of this kind is Becker’s (1983), which develops a 
theory of competition for subsidies among self-interested pressure groups. These groups choose the levels 
of rent-seeking activity, which determine transfers through an exogenously given (“black-boxed”) 
political influence function. This second assumption leads to an endogenous explanation of the political 
aspect of the SBC syndrome. The Public Choice Theory develops this endogenous explanation of the 
SBC. 
3-2-1. The benevolent government assumption and the SBC 
 As we have already substantiated the Kornai and Weibull model, we focus here on the externality 
and the insider control models. In Segal (1998), the divergence between the firm’s profit-maximizing 
outcome and the social objective is attributed to monopoly power. If the firm in trouble has a monopoly 
power, then its liquidation may engender important negative externalities. The collapse of the firm will 
cause not only supply problems in the sector in which the firm enjoys a monopoly position, but also a 
drastic fall in the demand for the products of its suppliers. Hence the government that wishes to maximize 
social surplus will attempt to induce the monopolist to produce and in case of problem would provide a 
subsidy. This subsidy could well exceed the profit that the monopolist foregoes by not investing. In other 
words, the monopolist may take advantage of deliberately putting itself in a position of weakness in order 
                                                            
25 For a summary of these criticisms, see Persson and Tabellini, 1990. For the effect of the SBC on coordination 
problem in developing economies, see Aizenman, 1993. 
 20
to exploit the government. In this model, the softness of the BC is defined as the willingness of the 
government to bail out an unprofitable monopoly in order to avoid negative extenalities. The presence of 
such externalities indicates that if a benevolent government wants to correct the ex post laissez-faire 
outcome, it is due to some market imperfections that makes this outcome socially inefficient. In this 
model, the SBC leads to two possible kinds of inefficiency. First, there is an allocative loss due to the 
failure of the monopolist to invest; second, if the subsidy is financed by distortionary taxation or inflation, 
an additional dead weight loss is sustained. In our opinion, the major result of this analysis is that 
“(P)rivatization need not harden budget constraints in concentrated industries, and that the resulting 
welfare loss provides a stronger case for demonopolization than the traditional concern for competitive 
pricing.” (Segal, 1998, p. 606). This result is very close to Kornai’s criticizm of the widely believed idea 
at the outset of the post-socialist transition that the ‘Holy Trinity’ of liberalization, privatization and 
stabilization would suffice to produce an efficient market. “Hardening the budget constraint is a task of 
equal rank with them, as experience in Russia has shown.” (see Kornai, 1999b, p. 13). However, 
decetralization is not a sufficient condition to overcome the SBC. As Daveri and Panunzi (1997) highlight 
the beneficial effect of decentralization on the hardness of the firm’s budget constraint depends on having 
positive spillovers among the decentralized parties. Decentralization softens the budget constraint in case 
of negative spillovers among the decentralized parties. In fact, Segal does not compare the softness and 
hardness of BC in case of monopolized and demonopolized firms in the presence of positive or negative 
spillovers among decentralized firms. Moreover, a non-monopolized firm may also be subject to a SBC if 
its behaviour is not one of profit-maximizing, but simply a saticficing one which tries to survive and avoid 
organizational death. Li’s model of insiders’ control (Li, 1998) provides a good example of this type.      
 The model emphasizes insiders’, or managers’ control rights as a cause of the SBC. Suppose that 
the insiders are de facto decision makers of the enterprise even though they are not de jure proprietors. For 
instance, managers borrow from creditors but still hold key control rights. Imagine further that insiders 
have significant stakes in controlling the enterprise. Then in case of major financial losses, insiders may 
well oppose the liquidation of the plant in order to maintain their control benefit. Subsequently, many 
bankrupt firms survive because of insiders’ control. Nonetheless, this result may be ex post socially 
efficient if we take into account the insiders’ control benefits. However, it should be noted that the 
outcome is ex ante inefficient, since insiders may abuse their control rights to promote their own benefit. 
Besides, rational creditors may anticipate such an oucome and refuse to consent loans to insider-controlled 
firms. This hypothetical situation is very close to the post-socialist Russia (see Aoki, 1995; Stiglitz, 1999).  
3-2-2. The “malevolent” government assumption and the SBC 
 Political considerations such as the prestige of a superior authority, or personal connections 
between the heads of different governments may be the cause of the SBC. As Anderson (1995) underlines, 
because of the political importance of non-market, concessional or politically motivated external financing 
in the Middle East after the second World War, the regimes of the region came to participate in the 
international system in much the same way as managers of state-owned enterprises operate in command or 
socialist economies. “Like the firm managers who are accustomed to the authoritative allocation of 
command economies, the rulers of the developing world are subject to soft budget constraints.” 
(Anderson, 1995, p. 31). The importance of these political considerations regarding the relationship 
between states notwithstanding, economists try to capture the political element of the SBC in the 
particular relation between the state and firms. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) deals with this aspect 
of the SBC problem. The authors define privatisation as the reallocation of control rights over 
employment from politicians to managers and the increase in cash flow ownership of managers and 
private sectors (Boycko et al., 1996, p. 316). This definition captures both aspects of property rights, 
namely the residual control rights and residual income. In their model of privatization, Boycko et al. 
describe politicians as giving subsidies to induce firms to maintain higher level of employment. Hence, the 
subsidies are regarded as the outcome of “paternalistic” preferences of politicians and soften the budget 
constraint. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the authors broaden the concept of SBC, since it covers 
the subsidies targeting higher level of employment in general and not only those subsidies destinated to 
rescue the loss-making firms.  
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 Analysing the relationship between politicians and managers, Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 1994) 
and Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) illustrate the Coase theorem by stressing the role of corruption 
in raising efficiency. When side-payments in the form of bribes are allowed, the manager and the 
politician choose the outcome that, from their joint viewpoint, is the most efficient. The bribe divides the 
surplus between the manager and the politician according to the Nash or some other bargaining solution. 
In this sense, corruption can be compared to reputation in providing a mechanism of contract 
enforcement. However, as Shleifer (1994) argues, in transition economies the horizons of politicians are 
often too short to develop a reputation for efficient bribe taking. It should be noted that the corruption case 
is to some extent exempt from renegotiation. Since in most societies corruption is illegal, both the giver 
and the receiver of a bribe risk going to jail. This type of analysis of property rights as both control and 
cash flow rights has largely contributed to the understanding of some informal institutions such as 
corruption. This approach endogenizes the political aspect of the SBC and tries to show that the 
inefficiency of public firms is due to the agency problem with politicians rather than with managers. “We 
believe that managerial discretion problems are usually minor relative to political discretion problems. 
Privatisation works because it controls political discretion.” (Boycko et al., 1996, p.318). Hence, the 
softness of the BC is a strategic choice of politicians who maximize a particular kind of “political 
function”, whereas managers as profit-maximizers are more prone to maintain a HBC. 
 In both the Complete (optimal) Contracts Theory and the Public Choice Theory, the degree of 
budget constraint is more a matter of choice, and results from the strategic behaviour of Agents 
(managers) or Principals (politicians). As long as all economic and political actors are supposed to be 
hyper-rational and optimizers under all circumstances, constraints do not pose any serious problem26.  
 Hence, this recent literature has adopted a position which is in direct opposition to Clower’s 
conception of the budget constraint, since the BC is treated as equivalent to equilibrium and optimality 
conditions. While for Clower the application of rationality postulate (Say’s Principle or BC) as a 
behavioural regularity is entirely consistent with a disequilibrium state of market economy (non 
application of the Walras Law), the recent literature contends that the realization of the BC as a rational 
choice satisfies the optimality condition and corresponds to an equilibrium state. It should be noted that 
the maximizing (optimizing) condition is also contradictory with Kornai’s original analysis of the SBC as 
a behavioural regularity in accordance with the satisficing criterion. Nonetheless, Kornai’s efficiency 
analysis, based upon the comparison of the socialist system as a SBC economy with reference to an ideal 
market economy as a HBC economy, may be regarded as a theoretical background for this recent 
literature.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, we have distinguished three different conceptions of the BC. The first one, 
introduced by Clower, regards the BC as a universal (unconditional) rational planning postulate. This does 
not imply market equilibrium or optimality, since what may be expected or planned by individual agents 
or even all agents would not necessarily be realized. Consequently, the rational behaviour of agents does 
not exclude market disequilibrium. The market equilibrium requires a particular kind of coordination 
which cannot automatically be satisfied by assuming rational individual choices.  
 The second one, advocated by Kornai, considers the BC as a conditional empirical fact regarding 
the specific behavioural regularity of agents that is determined by particular institutional setups. In this 
perspective, the BC is related to the survival behaviour of boundedly rational (saticficing) agents. It 
                                                            
26 In defining “economic imperialism”, Lazear (1999) draws a particular line of demarcation between economists 
and sociologists: “Economists, almost without exception, make constrained maximization the basic building block of 
any theory...the theoretical revisions almost never drop the assumption that individuals are maximizing something, 
even if the something is unorthodox..we do not model behavior as being determined by forces beyond the control of 
individual. Most sociologists, by contrast, argue that understanding the constraints is more important than 
understanding the behavior that results from optimization, given the constraints.” (1999, p. 2). 
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neither implies market equilibrium nor optimality. In fact, the normal state of any economic system is 
regarded to be a specific kind of disequilibrium. 
 The third one is implicitly held by a number of endogenous explanations of the SBC notably by 
the Complete (optimal) Contracts Theory and the Public Choice Theory. It regards the BC as a matter of 
choice by rational agents. The BC is defined as a strategic behaviour of (hyper)rational agents. This 
implies market equilibrium and optimality. As rational dynamic optimization suffices to assure 
intertemporal equilibrium, the coordination problem between individuals is assumed to be resolved and 
disequilibrium is disregarded. 
 While Clower and Kornai try to understand the BC in the context of disequilibrium or at least 
independently of equilibrium or optimality conditions, the partisans of the third approach integrate the BC 
in the process of dynamic optimization. Clower reduces the BC to a fundamental convention of standard 
microeconomics, whereas Kornai stresses the importance of particular institutional setups in determining 
the behavioural regularity of agents. Although Kornai’s conception of the BC is irreconcilable with the 
third approach, it should be noted that Kornai’s standpoint is contradictory. In his appraisal of the HBC in 
case of competitive market economy, Kornai contends that the application of the BC is equivalent to the 
realization of Walras’ Law. He, then, uses this ideal HBC as a normative reference in order to measure the 
inefficiencies of the SBC. In fact, Kornai’s standpoint with regard to the HBC and his efficiency analysis 
are in tune with the third approach.   
 
Bibliography 
 
Ambrus-Lakatos L. and I. Csaba (1990), “The Effects of Profit Redistribution on the Level of Input Use: A Model of 
the Socialist Firm,” Yearbook of East-European Economics, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 75-96. 
Aghion P., M. Dewatripont, and P. Rey (1994), “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,” 
Econometrica, vol. LXII, pp. 257-82. 
Aizenman J. (1993), “Soft Budget Constraints, Taxes, and the Incentive to Cooperate,” International Economic 
Review, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 819-32. 
Anderson L. (1995), “Peace and Democracy in the Middle East: The Constraints of Soft Budgets,” Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 25-44. 
Aoki M. (1995), “Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies,” in Aoki M. 
and H.K. Kim (eds.), Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks, The 
World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Arrow K. J. and G. Debreu (1954), “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy,” Econometrica, vol. 
22, pp. 265-290. 
Arrow K. J. and F.H. Hahn (1971), General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco, Holden-Day. 
Bai C. and Y. Wang (1995), A Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint, Boston College Working Papers in Economics, 
Dept. of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167. 
Bai C. and Y. Wang (1998), “Bureaucratic Control and the Soft Budget Constraint,” Journal of Comparative 
Economics, vol. 26, pp. 41-61. 
Bajt A. (1991), “Irrelevance of the Soft Budget Constraint for the Shortage Phenomenon,” Economics of Planning, 
vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1-12. 
Bardhan P.K. (1993), “On Tackling the Soft Budget Constraint in Market Socialism,” in Bardhan P.K. and J.E. 
Romer (eds.), Market Socialism: The Current Debate, Oxford, New York, Toronto and Melbourne, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 145-55.  
Baumol W.J. (1977), “Say’s (at Least) Eight Laws, or What Say and James Mill May Really Have Meant?” 
Economica, vol. 44, pp. 65-80. 
Baumol W.J. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, New York, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
 23
Becker G. (1983), “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 98, pp. 371-400.  
Begg D. and R. Portes (1993), “Enterprise debt and economic transformation: financial restructuring in Central and 
Eastern Europe,” in Mayer C. and X. Vives (eds.), Capital Markets and Financial Intermediaries, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 230-61. 
Berglof E. and G. Roland (1997), “Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition,” European 
Economic Review, vol. 41, pp. 807-817. 
Berglof E. and G. Roland (1998), “Soft budget constraints and banking in transition economies,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, vol. 26, pp. 18-40. 
Bös D. and C. Lülfesmann (1996), “The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting,” Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, vol. 98, no. 1, pp. 53-74. 
Boycko M., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1996), “A Theory of Privatisation,” The Economic Journal, vol. 106, no. 
435, pp. 309-319. 
Cheung T. Y. (1991), “Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing,” Review of Economic Studies, 
vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 1031-42. 
Clower R. (1965), “The Keynesian Counterrevolution: A Theoretical Appraisal,” in Hahn F. H. and P.P.R. Brechling  
(eds.), The Theory of Interest Rates, London, Macmillan, Chapter 5. 
 
Clower R. and J.F. Due (1972), Microeconomics, Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Erwin, Sixth edition. 
 
Clower R. and A. Leijonhufvud (1975), “The Coordination of Economic Activities: A Keynesian Perspective,” The 
American Economic Review, vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 182-88. 
 
Clower R. and A. Leijonhufvud (1981), “Say’s Principle, What It Means and Doesn’t Mean,” in Leijonhufvud A. 
(ed.), Information and Coordination, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Clower R. (1994), “Economics as an Inductive Science,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 805-814. 
Clower R. (1995), “Axiomatics in Economics,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 307-319. 
Costa M.L. (1998), General Equilibrium Analysis and the Theory of Markets, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, 
USA, Edward Elgar.  
Daver F. and F. Panunzi (1997), “Decentralization, Mobility Costs and the Soft Budget Constraint,” in Battigali P., 
A. Montesano, and F. Panunzi (eds.), Decisions, Games and markets, Boston, Dordrecht, London, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, pp. 209-38. 
Debreu G. (1959), Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, New York, John Wiley and 
Sons.  
Dewatripont M. and E. Maskin (1995), “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economics,” Review 
of Economic Studies, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 541-555. 
Dewatripont M. and J. Tirole (1996), “Biased Principals as a Discipline Device,” Japan and the World Economy, 
vol. 8, pp. 195-206. 
Eisner R. (1975), “The Keynesian Revolution,” The American Economic Review, vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 189-94. 
Fischer S. (1999), “On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 85-105. 
Goldfeld S. and R. Quandt (1988), “Budget Constraints, Bailouts, and the Firm under Central Planning,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, vol. 12, pp. 502-520. 
Goldfeld S. and R. Quandt (1990), “Output Targets, the Soft Budget Constraint, and the Firm Under Central 
Planning,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 14, pp. 205-22. 
 24
Goldfeld S. and R. Quandt (1992), “Effect of Bailouts, Taxes, and Risk-Aversion on the Enterprise,” Journal of 
Comparative Economics, vol. 16, pp. 150-167. 
Goldfeld S. and R. Quandt (1993), “Uncertainty, Bailouts, and the Kornai Effect,” Economic Letters, vol. 41, pp. 
113-119.  
Gomulka S. (1986), “Kornai’s Soft Budget Constraint and the Shortage Phenomena : A Criticism and Restatement”, 
in Gomulka S. (ed.), Growth, Innovation and Reform in Eastern Europe, Madison, Wisconsin, University of 
Wisconsin Press, pp. 73-90. 
Hardy D. (1992), “Soft Budget Constraints, Firm Commitments, and the Social Safety Net,” IMF Staff  Papers, vol. 
39, no. 2, pp. 310-29. 
Hart O. (1990), “Is “Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?”, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 146, pp. 696-702. 
Hart O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Hart O. and J. Moore (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 755-785. 
Hicks J. (1939), Value and Capital, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Hillman A., E. Katz, and J. Rosenberg  (1987), “Workers as Insurance: Anticipated Government Assistance and 
Factor Demand,” Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 39, pp. 813-20. 
 
Huang H. and C. Xu (1998), “Soft Budget Constraint and the Optimal Choices of Research and Development 
Projects Financing,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 26, pp. 62-79. 
 
Jaffé W. (1954), Elements of Pure Economics, London, George Allen and Unwin. 
 
Kaldor N. (1982), The Scourage of Monetarism, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
 
Kaldor N. (1985), Economics without Equilibrium, The Arthur Okun Memorial Lectures, M.E. Sharpe, INC., 
Armonk, New York. 
 
Keren M. (1993), “On the (im)possibility of market socialism,” Eastern Economic Journal, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 
333-43. 
 
Knell M. (1988), “The Economics of Shortage and the Socialist Enterprise: A Criticism of Walrasian and 
Non-Walrasian Approach,” Review of Radical Political Economy, vol. 20, pp. 143-48. 
 
Kornai J. (1971), Anti-Equilibrium, Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
 
Kornai J. (1979), “Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems”, Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 
801-819. 
Kornai J. (1980), Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
 
Kornai J. and J. Weibull (1983), “Paternalism, Buyers’ and  Sellers’ Market,” Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 6, 
no. 2, pp. 153-69. 
 
Kornai J. (1984), “Bureaucratic and Market Coordination”, Osteuropa Wirtschaft, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 316-319. 
 
Kornai J. (1985), “Gomulka on the Soft Budget Constraint : A Reply”, Economics of Planning, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 
49-55. 
 
Kornai J. (1986), “The Soft Budget Constraint,” Kyklos, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 3-30. 
 
Kornai J. (1992), The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton, Oxford, Princeton 
University Press, Oxford University Press. 
 25
 
Kornai J. (1997), Struggle and Hope, Essays on Stabilization and Reform in a Post-Socialist Economy, Cheltenham, 
UK, Edward Elgar. 
 
Kornai J. (1998a), “The place of the soft budget constraint in economic theory,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 
vol. 26, pp. 11-17. 
 
Kornai J. (1998b), “ Legal Obligation, Non-Compliance and Soft Budget Constraint,” Entry in Paul Newman (ed.) 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, New York, Macmillan. 
 
Kornai J. (1999a), “The System Paradigm”, Collegium Budapest, Discussion Papers Series, no. 58, July 1999 
(Communication submitted to the conference “Paradigms of Social Change” organized by Berlin-Branderburgische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 3-5 September 1998). 
 
Kornai J. (1999b), Hardening the Budget Constraint: The Experience of Post-Socialist Economies, Invited lecture to 
be presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Economic Association, August 23-27, Mimeo, First Draft. 
 
Kornai J. (2000), Ten Years After ‘The Road to a Free Economy’: The Author’s Self-Evaluation, Paper for the World 
Bank ‘Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics-ABCDE’, April 18-20, Washington D.C. 
 
Kraft E. (1993), “The Soft Budget Constraint and the Theory of Endogenous Money: A Note on Szego’s Critique of 
Kornai,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 153-61. 
 
Lange O. (1942), “The Foundations of Welfare Economics,” Econometrica, July-October. 
 
Lazear E. (1999), Economic Imperialism, Working Paper 7300, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Mass. 
 
Li D.D. (1998), Insider Control and the Soft Budget Constraint: A Simple Theory, Economics Letters, vol. 61, pp. 
307-11. 
 
Magee K.L. and R.E. Quandt (1994), “The Kornai Effect with Partial Bailouts and Taxes,” Economic Planning, vol. 
27, pp. 27-38. 
 
Maskin E. (1996), “Theories of the Soft Budget-Constraint,” Japan and the World Economy, vol. 8, pp. 125-133. 
Maskin E. and J. Tirole (1999), “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” The Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 66, pp. 83-114. 
Nelson R. and S. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
North D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press. 
 
North D. (1993), “Institutions and Credible Commitment,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 
149, no. 1, pp. 11-23. 
 
Pareto V. (1909/1927), Manual of Political Economy, New York, Kelley, 1971. 
 
Pareto V. (1911), “Mathematical Economics”, International Economic Papers, vol. 5, 1955, pp. 58-102; translated 
from Encyclopédie des Sciences Mathématiques, vol. I (iv, 4), Paris, Teubner, Gauthier, Villars. 
 
Patinkin D. (1956), Money, Interest and Prices; an Integration of Monetary and Value Theory, Evanston, Ill., Row, 
Peterson. 
 
Persson T. and G. Tabellini (1990), Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, Switzerland, Chur; New York, 
Harwood Academic Publishers. 
 26
 
Pinto B., V. Derbentsov, and A. Morozov (1999), Dismantling Russia’s No-Payments System: Creating Conditions 
for Growth, Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Excerpts published in Transition, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 1-5. 
  
Prell M. (1996), “The Two Kornai Effects,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 22, pp. 267-76. 
 
Pun W.C. (1995), “The Kornai Effect and the Soft Budget Constraints,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 21, 
pp. 326-35. 
Qian Y. and G. Roland (1994), Regional Decentralization and the Soft Budget Constraint: The Case of China, 
Discussion Paper 1013, Center for Economic Policy Research. 
Qian Y. (1994), “Theory of Shortage in Socialist Economies,” The American Economic Review, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 
145-156. 
Qian Y. and G. Roland (1998), “Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint,” The American Economic Review, vol. 
88, no. 5, pp. 1143-1162. 
Raiser M. (1994), “The No-Exit Economy: Soft Budget Constraints and the Fate of Economic Reforms in 
Developing Countries,” World Development, vol. 22, no. 12, pp. 1851-67. 
Samuelson P. (1948), Economics, an Introductory Analysis, first edition, N.Y, McGraw-Hill Co. 
Schaffer M. (1989), “The credible-commitment problem in Cenral and Eastern Europe: budgetary subsidies and tax 
arrears,” in Newbery D. (ed.), Tax and Benefit Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Center for Economic Policy 
Research, London, pp. 115-144. 
Schaffer M. (1998), “Do firms in transition economies have soft budget constraint? A reconsideration of concepts 
and evidence,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 26, pp. 80-103. 
Schumpeter J. (1947), "The creative response in economic history", The Journal of Economic History, vol.7, no. 2, 
pp. 149-159. 
Schumpeter J. (1954), History of Economic Analysis, 3 vols, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Scott C. (1990), “Soft Budgets and Hard Rents: A Note on Kornai and Gomulka,” Economics of Planning, vol. 23, 
pp. 117-27. 
Segal I. (1998), “Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint,” Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 596-609. 
Shleifer A. (1994), “Establishing Property Rights,” Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on 
Development Economics, pp. 93-117. 
Shleifer A. and R. Vishny (1993), “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, pp. 599-618. 
Shleifer A. and R. Vishny (1994), “Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, pp. 995-1025. 
Simon H. (1952-53), “A Comparison of Organization Theories,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 20, pp. 
40-48. 
Simon H. (1991), "Organizations and markets", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, n°2, pp. 25-44. 
Simon H. (1997), An Empirically Based Microeconomics, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. 
Slutsky E.E. (1915), “On the Theory of the Budget of Consumer,” Giornale degh Economisti, vol. 51, pp. 1-26. 
Sowell T. (1972), Say’s Law, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Stiglitz J. (1994), Whither Socialism?, Wicksell Lectures, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Stiglitz J. (1999), Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition, World Bank Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, April 28-30, Keynote Address, Washington D.C. 
Szabó J. (1988), “Preliminary and Incremental Softness of the Budget Constraint: A Comment on the 
Gomulka-Kornai Debate,” Economics of  Planning, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 109-16.  
 27
Szamuely L. and Csaba L. (1998), “Economics and Systemic Changes in Hungary, 1945-1996,” in Wagener H. J. 
(ed.), Economic Thought in Communist and Post-Communist Europe, London, Routledge, pp. 158-213. 
Szego A. (1991), “The Logic of a Shortage Economy: A Critique of Kornai from a Kaleckian Macroeconomic 
Perspective,” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, vol. 13, pp. 328-36. 
Tirole J. (1994), Incomplete Contracts: Where do we stand? , Walras-Bowley lecture, delivered at the North 
American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Quebec City, Mimeo, IDEI, 53 pages. 
Tobin J. (1975), “Keynesian Models of Recession and Depression,” The American Economic Review, vol. 65, no. 2, 
pp. 195-202. 
Vahabi M. (1997), “De l’économie de la pénurie à l’économie politique du communisme. Sur l’évoluion récente de 
la pensée économique de Janos Kornai : 1980-1996”, revue d’économie politique, vol. 107, no. 6, pp. 831-852. 
Vahabi M. (1998), “The Relevance of the Marshallian Concept of Normality in Interior and in Inertial Dynamics as 
Revisited by G. Shackle and J. Kornai”, The Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 22, no 5, pp. 547-572. 
Vahabi M. (1999), From the Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions, 
Working Paper, Cahiers de la MSE, ROSES-CNRS, Série Jaune. 
Walker D.A. (1996), Walras’s market models, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Weber M. (1968), Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, New York, Bedminster Press. 
Wildasin D.E. (1997), Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations, Working Paper no. 1834, World Bank Policy Research, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Williamson O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, New-York, 
The Free Press. 
Williamson O. (1989), “The firm as a nexus of treaties: An Introduction” , in Aoki M, B. Gustafsson, and O. 
Williamson (eds.), The firm as a nexus of treaties, London, SCASS, Sage Publications. 
Williamson O. (1992), "Markets, hierarchies, and the modern corporation. An unfolding perspective," Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 17. 
Williamson O. (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
